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Hospital admissionsWe evaluate the impact of a policing experiment that depenalized the possession of small quantities of cannabis
in the London borough of Lambeth, on hospital admissions related to illicit drug use. To do so, we exploit admin-
istrative records on individual hospital admissions classiﬁed by ICD-10 diagnosis codes. These records allow the
construction of a quarterly panel data set for London boroughs running from 1997 to 2009 to estimate the short
and long run impacts of the depenalization policy unilaterally introduced in Lambeth between 2001 and 2002.
We ﬁnd that the depenalization of cannabis had signiﬁcant longer term impacts on hospital admissions related
to the use of hard drugs, raising hospital admission rates for men by between 40 and 100% of their pre-policy
baseline levels. The impacts are concentrated among men in younger age cohorts. The dynamic impacts across
cohorts vary in proﬁle with some cohorts experiencing hospitalization rates remaining above pre-intervention
levels three to four years after the depenalization policy is introduced. We combine these estimated impacts
on hospitalization rateswith estimates on how the policy impacted the severity of hospital admissions to provide
a lower bound estimate of the public health cost of the depenalization policy.
Crown Copyright © 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Illicit drug use generates substantial economic costs including those
related to crime, ill-health, and diminished labor productivity. In 2002,
the Ofﬁce for National Drug Control Policy estimated that illicit drugs
cost the US economy $181 billion (ONDCS, 2004). For the UK, Gordon
et al. (2006) estimated the cost of drug-related crime and health service
use to be £15.4 billion in 2003/4. It is these social costs, coupledwith the
risks posed to drug users themselves, that have led governments
throughout the world to try and regulate illicit drug markets. All such
policies aim to curb both drug use and its negative consequences, but
there is ongoing debate among policy-makers as to relative weight
that should be given to policies related to prevention, enforcement,
and treatment (Grossman et al., 2002).access to the Hospital Episode
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r B.V. This is an open access articleThe current trend in policy circles is to suggest regimes built solely
around strong enforcement and punitive punishment might be both
costly and ineffective. For example, after forty-years of the US ‘war on
drugs’, the Obama administration has adopted a strategy that focuses
more on prevention and treatment, and less on incarceration (ONDCS,
2011), although the two primary enforcement and policy agencies of
the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Ofﬁce for National Drug Control
Policy remain more focused on traditional supply-side approaches.
Other countries such as the Netherlands, Australia and Portugal, have
long adopted more liberal approaches that have depenalized or
decriminalized the possession of some illicit drugs, most commonly
cannabis, with many countries in Latin America currently debating sim-
ilar moves.1 While such policies might well help free up resources from
the criminal justice system and stop large numbers of individuals being
criminalized (Adda et al., 2013), these more liberalized policies also
carry their own risks. If such policies signal the health and legal risks
from consumption have been reduced, then this should reduce prices
(Becker and Murphy, 1988). This can potentially increase the number
of users as well as increasing use among existing users, all of which
could have deleterious consequences for user's health. The use of certain1 A recent policy announcement by theUSAttorneyGeneral EricHolder in August 2013,
signaled that a “fundamentally new approach” would be tried in which federal prosecu-
tors will no longer seek mandatory sentences for some non-violent drug offenders.
Uruguay now appears set to be the ﬁrst country to legalize the sale and production of
cannabis.
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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tive substances (van Ours, 2003; Melberg et al., 2010).
This paper considers the impact of a localized policing experiment
that reduced the enforcement of punishments against the use of one
illicit drug-cannabis-on a major cost associated with the consumption
of illegal drugs: the use of health services by consumers of illicit drugs.
The policing experiment we study took place unilaterally in the
London Borough of Lambeth and ran from July 2001 to July 2002, during
which time all other London boroughs had no change in policing policy
towards cannabis or any other illicit drug. The experiment-known as
the Lambeth CannabisWarning Scheme (LCWS)-meant that the posses-
sion of small quantities of cannabis was temporarily depenalized, so
that this was no longer a prosecutable offense.2 We evaluate the short
and long run consequences of this policy on healthcare usage as mea-
sured by detailed and comprehensive administrative records on drug-
related admissions to all London hospitals. Such hospital admissions
represent 60% of drug-related healthcare costs (Gordon et al., 2006).
To do so we use a difference-in-difference research design that com-
pares pre- and post-policy changes in hospitalization rates between
Lambeth and other London boroughs. Our analysis aims to shed light
on the broad question of whether policing strategies towards the
market for cannabis impact upon public health, through changes in
the use of illicit drugs and subsequent health of drug users.
Our primary data comes from a novel source that has not beenmuch
used by economists: the Inpatient Hospital Episode Statistics (HES).
These administrative records document every admission to a public hos-
pital in England, with detailed ICD-10 codes for classifying the primary
and secondary causes of each individual hospital admission.3 This is the
most comprehensive health related data available for England, in which
it is possible to track the admissions history of the same individual over
time. We aggregate the individual HES records to construct a panel data
set of hospital admissions rates by London borough and quarter. We do
so for various cohorts deﬁned along the lines of gender, age at the time
of the implementation of the depenalization policy, and previous hospital
admission history. As such these administrative records allow us to
provide detailed evidence on the aggregate impact of the depenalization
policy on hospitalization rates, and to provide novel evidence on how
these health impacts vary across cohorts. To reiterate, these administra-
tive records cover the most serious health events. Patients with less seri-
ous conditions receive treatment elsewhere, including outpatient
appointments, accident and emergency departments, or primary care
services. If such health events are also impacted by drug policing strate-
gies, our estimates based solely on inpatient records provide a strict
lower bound impact of the depenalization of cannabis on public health.2 Donohue et al. (2011) categorize illicit drug policies into three types: (1) legalization— a
system in which possession and sale are lawful but subject to regulation and taxation; (ii)
criminalization— a system of proscriptions on possession and sale backed by criminal pun-
ishment, potentially including incarceration; (iii) depenalization— a hybrid system, inwhich
sale and possession are proscribed, but the prohibition on possession is backed only by such
sanctions as ﬁnes ormandatory substance abuse treatment, not incarceration. The LCWS po-
licing experimentwe evaluate is a policy of depenalization. The practicalway inwhich itwas
implemented is very much in line with policy changes in other countries that have changed
enforcement strategies in illicit drug markets and as such we expect our results to have ex-
ternal validity to those settings, including for the current debate on the potential decriminal-
ization of cannabis in California (Kilmer et al., 2010). As discussed in Chu (2012), medical
marijuana legislation represents amajor change in US policy in recent years, where 17 states
have now passed laws that allow individuals with speciﬁc symptoms to use marijuana for
medical purposes.
3 Private healthcare constitutes less than 10% of the healthcare market in England, with
most admissions for elective procedures. Focusing on admissions to public hospitals is
therefore unlikely to produce a biased evaluation of the policing policy on drug-related hos-
pitalizations. The HES contains an inpatient and an outpatient data set. We only use the in-
patient data. The inpatient data includes all those admitted to hospital (under the order of a
doctor) who are expected to stay at least one night, and contains ICD-10 diagnosis classiﬁ-
cations. The outpatient data covers those in which a patient is seen but does not require a
hospital bed for recovery purposes (except for a short recovery after a speciﬁc procedure).
We do not use the HES outpatients data because it is only reliable from 2006/7 onwards
(and so not before the LCWS is initiated) anddoes not have information on diagnosis codes.The balanced panel datawe construct covers all 32 London boroughs
between April 1997 and December 2009. This data series starts four
years before the initiation of the depenalization policy in the borough
of Lambeth, allowing us to estimate policy impacts accounting for un-
derlying trends in hospital admissions. The series runs to seven years
after the policy ended, allowing us to assess the long term impacts of a
short-lived formal change in policing strategy related to cannabis.
Given the detailed ICD-10 codes available for each admission, the ad-
ministrative records allow us to speciﬁcallymeasure admission rates for
drug-related hospitalizations for each type of illicit drug: although the
depenalization policy would most likely impact cannabis consumption
more directly than other illicit drugs, this has to be weighed against the
fact that hospitalizations related to cannabis usage are extremely rare
and so policy impacts are statistically difﬁcult tomeasure along thismar-
gin. Ourmain outcome variable therefore focuses on hospital admissions
related to hard drugs, known as ‘Class-A’ drugs in England. This includes
all hospital admissions where the principal diagnosis relates to cocaine,
crack, crystal-meth, heroin, LSD, MDMA ormethadone.4 The administra-
tive records also contain information on the length of hospital stays
(in days) associated with each patient admission, and we use this to
explore whether the depenalization policy impacted the severity of hos-
pital admissions (not just their incidence), where the primary diagnosis
relates to hospitalizations for Class-A drug use. Ultimately, we then com-
bine the estimated policy impacts on hospitalization rates and the sever-
ity of hospital admissions for Class-A drug use, to provide a conservative
estimate of the public health costs of the depenalization policy that arises
solely through the increased demand on hospital bed services.
We present fourmain results. First, relative to other London boroughs,
the depenalization policy had signiﬁcant long term impacts on hospital
admissions in Lambeth related to the use of Class-A drugs, with the im-
pacts being concentrated among men. Exploring the heterogeneous im-
pacts across male cohorts, we ﬁnd the direct impacts on Lambeth
residents to be larger among cohorts that were younger at the start of
the policy. The magnitudes of the impacts are large: the increases in hos-
pitalization rates correspond to rises of between 40 and 100% of their pre-
policy baseline levels in Lambeth, for those aged 15–24 and aged 25–34
on the eve of the policy. To underpin the credibility of the difference-in-
difference research design, we also probe the data to: (i) check for pre-
existing divergent trends in hospitalization rates between Lambeth and
other Londonboroughs; (ii) evaluate the robustness of the results to alter-
native control boroughs to compare Lambeth to; (iii) examine whether
differential changes over time in health care provision between Lambeth
and other locations, or other policies impacting hospitalizations for Class-
A drug use, could confound the results, and; (iv) shed light on whether
individuals changed borough of residence in response to the policy.
Second, the dynamic impacts across cohorts vary in proﬁle with
some cohorts experiencing hospitalization rates remaining above
pre-intervention levels three to four years after the depenalization of
cannabis was ﬁrst introduced.
Third, we explore the impacts of the policy on hospitalizations
related to alcohol use among Lambeth residents. There is a body of
work examining the relationship between cannabis and alcohol use:
this has generated mixed results with some research ﬁnding evidence
of the two being complements (Pacula, 1998; Williams et al., 2004),
and other studies suggesting that the two are substitutes (DiNardo4 The UK has a three tiered drug classiﬁcation system, with assignment from Class-C to
Class-A intended to indicate increasing potential harm to users. Class-A drugs include co-
caine, crack, crystal-meth, heroin, LSD, MDMA and methadone. Much of the ongoing pol-
icy debate on the decriminalization or depenalization of cannabis, reclassifying it from
Class-B to Class-C, stems from the fact that legal drugs such as alcohol and tobacco, are
thought to have higher levels of dependency and cause more physical harm to users than
some illicit drugs including cannabis (Nutt et al., 2007).
6 As with the economics literature the bulk of the criminology literature has also focused
on the crime impacts of drug enforcement policies. One exception is Hughes and Stevens
(2010) who study the wider impacts of the decriminalization of cannabis introduced in
Portugal in 2001. However the evidence they present is based either on Europewide survey
data and compares trends in Portugal to those in Spain and Italy, or stakeholder interviews
in Portugal. They do not present regression estimates to measure causal impacts. MacCoun
and Reuter (2001) discuss the health impacts of cannabis depenalization after reviewing
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using a novel policy experiment and administrative data. Our results
suggest that for the youngest age cohort, if depenalization causes the
price of cannabis to fall, then alcohol and cannabis mightwell be substi-
tutes. However for older age cohorts,weﬁndnoevidence that thepolicy
leads to increased admissions related to alcohol use, or the combined
use of alcohol and Class-A drugs.
Finally, the severity of hospital admissions, as measured by the
length of stay in hospital, signiﬁcantly increases for admissions related
to Class-A drug use. We then combine this impact with our baseline es-
timated impacts on hospitalization rates by age cohort, to calculate the
annual cost of the policy.We ﬁnd the increased hospitalization rates and
length of stays conditional on admission to be around £80,000 per
annum, and this more than offsets the downward time trend in hospital
bed-day costs that exists in the rest of London in the post-policy period.
Taken together, our four classes of results suggest that policing strat-
egies towards the market for cannabis have signiﬁcant, nuanced and
long lasting impacts on public health.
Our analysis contributes to understanding the relationship between
drug policies and public health, an area that has received relatively little
attention despite the sizable social costs involved. This partly relates to
well known difﬁculties in evaluating policies in illicit drug markets:
multiple policies are often simultaneously targeted towards high supply
locations; even when unilateral policy experiments or changes occur
they often fail to cause abrupt or quantitatively large demand or supply
shocks, and data is rarely detailed enough to pin down interventions in
speciﬁc drug markets on other drug-related outcomes (DiNardo, 1993;
Caulkins, 2000; Chu, 2012). Our analysis, that combines a focused policy
and administrative records, makes some progress on these fronts.
To place our analysis into awider context, it is useful to compare our
ﬁndings with two earlier prominent studies linking illicit drug enforce-
ment policies and health outcomes: Model (1993) uses data from the
mid-1970s to estimate the impact on hospital emergency room admis-
sions of cannabis decriminalization, across 12 US states. She ﬁnds that
policy changes led to an increase in cannabis-related admissions and a
decrease in the number of mentions of other drug related emergency
room admissions, suggesting a net substitution towards cannabis. Our
administrative records also allowus to also check for such broad patterns
of substitution or complementarity between illicit drugs. Our results sug-
gest that the depenalization of cannabis led to longer term increases in
the use of Class-A drugs, as measured by hospital inpatient admissions
rather than emergency room admissions as in Model (1993).5
More recent evidence comes from Dobkin and Nicosia (2009), who
assess the impact of an intervention that disrupted the supply of meth-
amphetamine in the US by targeting precursors to methamphetamine.
They document how this led to a sharp price increase and decline in
quality for methamphetamine. Hospital admissions mentioning meth-
amphetamine fell by 50% during the intervention, while admissions
into drug treatment fell by 35%. Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) ﬁnd no evi-
dence that users substituted away from methamphetamine towards
other drugs. Finally, Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) ﬁnd that the policy of
disrupting methamphetamine supply was effective only for a relatively
short period: the price of methamphetamine returned to its pre-
intervention level within four months and within 18 months hospital
admissions rates had returned to their baseline levels. In contrast, the
cannabis depenalization policywe document has an impact on hospital-
ization rates that, for many cohorts, lasts for up to four years after the5 An important distinction between our data and that used in Model (1993) is that the
HES data has a patient-episode as its unit of observation, rather than ‘drug mentions’ of
which Model (1993) reports up to six per patient-episode. Moreover, the data used in
Model (1993) are not administrative records, butwere collected by theDrugAbuseWarn-
ing Network from emergency rooms in 24major SMSAs. AsModel (1993) discusses, some
data inconsistencies arise because the emergency rooms in the sample change over time.policy was initiated and despite the fact that the policy itself was only
formally in place for one year.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the LCWS and
the existing evidence on its impact on crime. Section 3 details our
administrative data, discusses the plausibility of a link between
policing-induced changes in the cannabis market and the consumption
of Class-A drugs, and describes our empiricalmethod. Section 4 presents
our baseline results which estimate the impact of the LCWS by cohort
and the associated robustness checks to underpin the credibility of the
research design. Section 5 presents extended results related to dynamic
effects, spillovers in alcohol-related admissions, and the severity of
admissions. Section 6 estimates the public health costs of the policy.
Section 7 discusses the broader policy implications of our ﬁndings,
and the potential for opening up a research agenda on the relationship
between police behavior and public health.2. The Lambeth Cannabis Warning Scheme (LCWS)
The Lambeth CannabisWarning Scheme (LCWS)was unilaterally in-
troduced into the London borough of Lambeth on 4th July 2001 by the
borough's police force. The scheme was initially launched as a pilot
intended to last six months, and represented a change in policing policy
towards themarket for cannabis. Under the scheme, those found in pos-
session of small quantities of cannabis for their personal use in Lambeth:
(i) had their drugs conﬁscated; (ii) were given a warning rather than
being arrested.7 The main reason behind the policy change was to re-
duce the number of individuals being criminalized for consuming
cannabis, and to free up police time and resources to deal withmore se-
rious crimes, including those related to hard drugs or ‘Class-A drugs’
(Dark and Fuller, 2002; Adda et al., 2013). The underlying motivations
for the policy, as well as the way in which it was implemented and
the targeted outcomes, were very similar to the way in which cannabis
depenalization policies have often been implemented throughout the
world. In keepingwith other experiences of depenalization, the primary
motivation behind the policywas to free up police time and resources to
tackle other crimes, and there was little or no discussion of the
depenalization policy's potential impact on public health. To this extent
our results can be informative of the existence of links between police
drugs policy and public health in settings outside of the speciﬁc
London context we study.8
Anecdotal evidence suggests that local support for the schemebegan
to decline once the policy was announced to have been extended be-
yond the initial six-month pilot. Media reports cited that local opposi-
tion arose due to concerns that children were at risk from the scheme,
and that the depenalization policy had increased drug tourism into
Lambeth. The LCWS formally ended on 31st July 2002. Post-policy,
Lambeth's cannabis policing strategy did not return identically to whatevidence from a range of countries.
7 The LCWS policy applied equally to juveniles and adults (the age of criminal responsi-
bility in England andWales is 10 years old).
8 For example, there have beenmoves over the past decade in California towards more
liberal policies related to cannabis. In 2010 California passed into law a depenalization pol-
icy that reduced the penalty associated with being found in possession of less than one
ounce of cannabis, from a misdemeanor to a civil infraction. Further moves to a more lib-
eral regulation of the cannabis market — almost to the point of legalization — remain on
the policy agenda in California (Kilmer et al., 2010). The moves to introduce legislation
allowing for medical marijuana have also been pronounced, with 17 US states currently
having such laws in place (Chu, 2012).
11 We include all episodes of each hospital stay, so that if a patient is under the care of
different consultants during their stay in hospital and before discharge, these count as
multiple patient-episodes. Given the infrequency with which the same patient transfers
across consultants during a hospital stay, the main results presented are robust to re-
deﬁning episodes at the patient–consultant level.
12 Between10 and12%of thepopulation inEngland haveprivate health insurance, large-
ly provided by employers. However, this is typically a top-up to NHS care, and does not
cover serious illness ormost emergencies. Private hospitals donot have emergency rooms,
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lice and local politicians over the policy's true impact. Rather, it adjusted
to be a ﬁrmer version of what had occurred during the pilot so that po-
lice ofﬁcers in Lambeth continued to issuewarnings butwould now also
have the discretion to arrest where the offense was aggravated.9 Hence
ourmeasured long run impacts of the depenalization policy capture the
total effects arising from: (i) the long run impact of the introduction
of the depenalization policy between June 2001 and July 2002; and
(ii) any permanent differences in policing towards cannabis between
the pre-policy and post-policy periods.
The impact of the LCWS depenalization policy on patterns of crime in
Lambeth and other boroughs is extensively studied in Adda et al. (2013).
For the purposes of the current study on the relationship between drug-
policing and public health, three key results on the impact of the localized
depenalization policy on crime need to be borne in mind: its impact on
the market for cannabis in Lambeth, its impact on the market for Class-
A drugs, and drug tourism induced into Lambeth from other parts of
London due to interlinkages in illicit drug markets across boroughs.
First, Adda et al. (2013)ﬁnd that the LCWS led to a signiﬁcant and per-
manent rise in cannabis related criminal offenses in Lambeth. Using ﬁnely
disaggregated data by type of drug offense, they ﬁnd that both the de-
mand and supply of cannabis are likely to have risen signiﬁcantly in Lam-
beth after the introduction of the depenalization policy, and that this
impact persists into the long run, well after the LCWS policy ofﬁcially
ended. This result is important for the current study because it suggests
that the depenalization policy caused an abrupt, quantitatively large and
permanent shock to the cannabismarket, leading to the equilibriummar-
ket size to have likely increased by around 60% in the longer term, as
proxied by the number of criminal offenses for cannabis possession.10
Second, this expansion will consequently affect the equilibrium
market size for Class-A drugs if the markets are related in some way,
either because of economies of scale in supplying both drug markets,
or because on the demand side preferences are such that cannabis and
Class-A drugs are complements/substitutes. Along these lines, Adda
et al. (2013) report that the longer term effect of the LCWS was to lead
to a signiﬁcant increase in offenses related to the possession of Class-A
drugs: offense rates for the possession of such substances rose by 12%
in Lambeth in the post-policy period relative to the rest of London. How-
ever, there is little evidence that the police reallocated their efforts to-
wards crimes relating to Class-A drugs: Adda et al. (2013) report no
change in police effectiveness against Class-A drug crime in Lambeth
based on two out of four suchmeasures (arrest and clear-up rates). Rath-
er, Adda et al. (2013) document that the policy appears to have allowed
the police to reallocate effort towards non-drug crime. The fact that the
LCWS policy did not lead to a major reallocation of police resources to-
wards crime related to Class-A drugs suggests that in the current study,
any link between the depenalization policy and hospitalizations for
Class-A diagnoses most likely stems from the interlinkages between
the demand sides of the markets for cannabis and Class-A drugs. Given
the addictive nature of Class-A drugs, potential lags between cannabis
use and the use of Class-A drugs later in life, and potential lags in seeking
out and receiving treatment (Fergusson andHorwood 2000; Patton et al.,
2002; Arseneault et al., 2004), we might also reasonably expect any im-
pact of the LCWS on hospital admissions related to Class-A drug use to
last well into the post-policy period. We therefore later consider how
the effects of the LCWS on drug-related hospital admissions evolve
over time.
Third, Adda et al. (2013) document how the LCWS likely induced drug
tourism into Lambeth. Such changes in the location where individuals9 Aggravating factors included: (i) if the ofﬁcer feared disorder; (ii) if the person was
openly smoking cannabis in a public place; (iii) those aged 17 or underwere found in pos-
session of cannabis; and (iv) individuals found in possession of cannabis were in or near
schools, youth clubs or child play areas.
10 Relative to citywide trends, cannabis possession offenses in Lambeth increased by 29%
during the policy, and 61% in the post-policy period (August 2002 to January 2006) rela-
tive to the pre-policy period Adda et al. (2013).decided to purchase cannabis stems from the fact that local markets for
illicit drugs are inherently interlinked across Londonboroughs. To explore
this further in terms of health outcomes, we later investigate whether
there is any evidence of individuals permanently changing their actual
borough of residence to Lambeth, after the LCWS is introduced.
Standard consumer theory provides clear set of predictions on how
such depenalization policies can impact the use of cannabis and other
illicit drugs.Most existing studies assume that suchpolicies cause signif-
icant reductions in the price of cannabis (Thies and Register, 1993;
Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998; Williams et al., 2004). This will, all
else equal, increase the demand for cannabis in part because of greater
demands from existing users and also because of an impact on the
extensive margin so that new individuals choose to start consuming
cannabis at the lower price. This will have a positive impact on the con-
sumption of Class-A drugs if cannabis and Class-A drugs are contempo-
raneous complements in user preferences. It will also increase the
demand for Class-A drugs over time if the use of cannabis serves either
as a gateway to the use of other harder illicit drugs, or there is state de-
pendence so that cannabis users have particular characteristics that also
lead them to subsequently misuse Class-A drugs. Of course if cannabis
and Class-A drugs are substitutes, then the increased demand for canna-
bis resulting from the depenalization of cannabis possession should
reduce Class-A drug use and related hospitalizations. Such cross price
impacts might also exist between cannabis and alcohol (Pacula, 1998;
DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001). Hence we later also examine how hospi-
talization rates for diagnoses primarily related to alcohol use respond
to the depenalization policy.3. Data, descriptives and empirical method
3.1. Administrative records on hospital admissions
Data on hospital admissions are drawn from the Inpatient Hospital
Episode Statistics (HES). These provide an administrative record of
every inpatient health episode, deﬁned as a single period of care
under one consultant in an English National Health Service hospital.11
These administrative records are the most comprehensive data source
on health service usage for England. Inpatients include all those admit-
ted to hospitalwith the intention of an overnight stay, plus day case pro-
cedureswhen the patient is formally admitted to a hospital bed. As such,
these records cover the most serious health events. Patients with less
serious conditions receive treatment elsewhere, including outpatient
appointments, accident and emergency departments, or primary care
services. If such health events are also impacted by the depenalization
policing strategy, our estimates based solely on inpatient records pro-
vide a strict lower bound impact of the policy on public health. For
each patient-episode event in the administrative records, the data re-
cord the date of admission, total duration in hospital, and ICD-10 diag-
noses codes in order of importance. Background patient information
covers their age, gender, and their zip code of residence at the time of
admission.12and the use of private primary health care is very rare. The data will therefore capture a
very high proportion of adverse drug reactions that require treatment in hospital. The
ICD is the international standard diagnostic classiﬁcation for epidemiological and clinical
use. Data on admissions to hospital accident and emergency wards is not available for En-
gland for the study period, and administrative records on outpatients do not contain the
detailed ICD-10 diagnosis codes. Hence some of the health impacts of depenalization pol-
icies on more acute conditions that might not require overnight hospitalization, such as
drug poisonings or allergic reactions, will not be measured in our administrative records.
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and to cannabis use are impacted by the depenalization of cannabis
possession in Lambeth. For Class-A drug related admissions, we in-
clude episodes where the drug is mentioned as the primary diagno-
sis, namely those episodes directly caused by the use of Class-A
drugs. As hospital admissions for cannabis are far rarer, we include
episodes where the drug is mentioned as either a primary or a sec-
ondary diagnosis.13 As our main outcome relates to rates of hospital in-
patient admissions, we aggregate the individual patient-episode level
data by borough of residence and quarter, and calculate admission rates
per thousand population for diagnosis d, borough of residence b in quar-
ter q of year y as follows,
Admitdbqy ¼
Totdbqy
Popby
; ð1Þ
where Totdbqy are total number of hospital admissions for diagnosis d,
among those residing in borough b, in quarter q of year y, and Popby is
the population of borough b in year y (measured in thousands).
These admission rates are calculated by gender and age cohort,
where age is categorized into ten year bins (15–24, 25–34, 35–44)
and patient's age is deﬁned as that on the eve of the LCWS policy.
For each age–gender cohort, we create a panel of hospital admission
rates for all London boroughs, excluding those that neighbor Lam-
beth (Croydon, Merton, Southwark and Wandsworth). Neighboring
boroughs are excluded from our baseline speciﬁcations because of
the potential public health spillovers in those boroughs. Our sample
therefore covers hospital admissions among residents of 28 London
boroughs (including Lambeth), by quarter, from April 1997 to De-
cember 2009.14
As discussed inmore detail later, some specialist services required to
treat diagnoses involving the use of Class-A drugs, such as those relating
to mental health, are concentrated in a small subset of facilities that are
dispersed across London. Each of these specialist facilities would be ex-
pected to treat patients from across London.Hence the geographic infor-
mation we use to understand the impact of the localized LCWS policy
relates to the patient's borough of residence, not the borough in which
they are hospitalized. This helps ameliorate concerns that any changes
in drug related hospitalization rates are driven by changes in the provi-
sion of speciﬁc drug-related services through specialized hospitals in
London (that serve individual residents in multiple boroughs). In
Section 4.2 we provide evidence ruling out potentially confounding
changes on the supply side of medical care for heavy users of Class-A
drugs. Hence, any documented change in hospital admissions for
Class-A drug related diagnoses in Lambeth following the introduction13 Diagnoses that mention Class-A drugs include (drug speciﬁc) mental and behavioral
disorders (ICD-10 Codes F11 for opiods, F14 for cocaine, F16 for hallucinogens), intentional
and accidental poisoning (T400–T406 T408–T409), and the ﬁnding of the drug in the
blood (R781–R785). Diagnoses that mention cannabis include mental and behavioral dis-
orders (F12), and poisoning (T407).
14 Theory gives no guidance as to which age groups should be used. We focus on groups
covering the main ages that would likely be impacted by a policy related to the
depenalization of cannabis: those aged 15 to 44. We have then split this population into
three equal age cohorts to ensure that there are high enough admissions rates in each
group, and that the age groups overlap with the age bins for population estimates at the
borough level. More precisely, Annual Ofﬁce for National Statistics population estimates
at the borough level are only provided in ﬁve-year bands. As such, the estimates will only
record the size of a particular 10-year age cohort once every ﬁve years. For example, in
2001, the 25–34 cohort was equal to the population aged 20–24 plus the population 25–
29. To deal with this populations are interpolated in all other years, but taking a weighted
sum of the relevant cohorts. In 2002, the same cohort was 21–30, and was therefore split
between three ﬁve-year age bins. We therefore interpolate as follows: (0.8 × total aged
20–24) + total aged 25–29 + (0.2 × total aged 30–34). The results are robust to ﬁxing
the population at 2001 levels.of the LCWSmight then operate through twomechanisms: (i) a change
in behavior of those residents in Lambeth prior to the policy; and (ii) a
change in the composition of Lambeth residents, with the policy poten-
tially inducing a net inﬂow of people into the borough with a higher
propensity for Class-A drug use. In Section 4.2 we use our data to exam-
ine the relative importance of these channels: we ﬁnd little evidence of
systematic changes of residence in response to the policy, implying that
most of the impacts are driven by changes in behavior among those
already residing in Lambeth pre-policy.
The administrative records also allow us to create panels based on
prior histories of patient admissions because the HES records have
unique patient identiﬁers that allow the same patient to be tracked
over episodes between 1997 and 2009. We focus on histories of ad-
missions related to the use of either drugs (Class-A drugs, cannabis,
or other illicit drug), or alcohol, and create panels by borough-
quarter-age cohort-gender, for those with and without pre-policy
histories of admissions related to drugs or alcohol. Among those
with no pre-policy admissions, we calculate admission rates as per
Eq. (1), where by construction of this admission rate is zero before
the policy. For this group, we effectively estimate whether the
depenalization policy differentially impacted hospital admission
rates between Lambeth and other non-neighboring boroughs in the
period after the policy is ﬁrst initiated. For those with pre-policy ad-
mission rates (an obviously far smaller group of individuals than
those without admission histories), we change the numerator in
the admission rate to reﬂect the relevant ‘at risk’ population: hence
Popby is replaced by the number of distinct individuals admitted for
diagnoses related to illicit drugs or alcohol while residing in borough
b in the pre-policy period between April 1997 and June 2001 (which
given the small number of individuals with histories of such hospi-
talizations, is not measured in thousands).
The depenalization policy likely lowers prices for cannabis in
Lambeth, all else equal. Depenalization might then impact hospitali-
zations for Class-A diagnoses differently across cohorts based on
their prior histories of illicit drug use. Among those with no prior his-
tory of hospitalization for drug or alcohol use, the reduced price of
cannabis induced by the policy might lead to greater consumption
of Class-A drugs if they are complements to cannabis, or, for exam-
ple, cannabis acts as a gateway to such substances. To be clear,
among these cohorts we pick up the combined impacts among
those that were previously using illicit drugs (and potentially other
substances) but not so heavily so as to induce hospitalizations, as
well as those that begin to use cannabis and Class-A drugs for the
ﬁrst time as a result of the reduced price of cannabis. The administra-
tive data utilized does not allow us to separate out the policy impacts
stemming from each type of individual. Among the cohorts with his-
tories of hospitalization for drug or alcohol use even before the LCWS
is initiated, there are likely to be long term and heavy users of illicit
substances. Such individuals' consumption of Class-A drugs might
reasonably be more habitual and so less sensitive to changes in the
price of cannabis, so that this cohort might be less impacted by the
depenalization policy, all else equal.
3.2. Cannabis and Class-A drug use
Our primary interest is to understand how changes in police
enforcement strategies towards the cannabis market-as embodied in
the LCWS policy impact public health through changes in hospitalization
rates related to illicit drug use. Of course the policy would most directly
affect the consumption of cannabis, but changes in inpatient hospital ad-
missions related to cannabis use are statistically hard to detect given the
rarity of such events, as documented in detail below. It is therefore in-
structive to ﬁrst compare rates of drug related hospital admissions from
the HES administrative records, to rates of self-reported drug use from
household surveys the most reliable of which is the British Crime Survey
(BCS). Estimates from the BCS in 2002/3 indicate that cannabis was by far
Table 1
Hospital re-admission probabilities.Means, standard deviations in parentheses.
Admitted in 1997 or 1998 for
(1) Cannabis related diagnoses (2) Class-A drug related diagnoses (3) Alcohol-related diagnoses (4) All other diagnoses
Admitted in 2000–2004 for
Cannabis related diagnoses .092 .011 .005 .001
(.289) (.105) (.071) (.034)
Class-A related diagnoses .054 .257 .022 .004
(.227) (.440) (.145) (.061)
Alcohol-related diagnoses .060 .064 .225 .015
(.238) (.245) (.418) (.121)
All other diagnoses .283 .146 .208 .316
(.451) (.353) (.409) (.465)
Observations (individuals) 533 3950 15,595 485,992
Notes: Theﬁgures refer to the probability of re-admission as a hospital inpatient over the period 2000 to 2004 (as shown in each row), conditional on an earlier hospital admission in 1997
or 1998 (as shown in each column). Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. For each type of admission related to a risky behavior (Class-A drugs, cannabis, alcohol), we
include episodes that mention this substance as either a primary or secondary diagnosis. We exclude a small number of cases for those admitted for more than one behavior related to
cannabis, Class-A drugs and alcohol in 1997 or 1998. The sample is based on all men aged 10–39 on 1st July 2001, the eve of the LCWS policy. The sample is drawn from all London
boroughs, except Lambeth, plus all unitary authorities Greater Manchester, Merseyside, the West Midlands, Tyne and Wear, and South Yorkshire (that are outside of London). The total
number of men admitted between 2000 and 2004 are as follows: 3446 for cannabis related diagnoses; 14,105 for Class-A drug related diagnoses; 53,033 of alcohol-related diagnoses;
1,325,795 for all other diagnoses. The ICD-10 classiﬁcations used for each diagnosis are as follows: Class-A drug related (F11, F14, F16, T400–T406, T408–T409, R781–R785); Cannabis
related (F12, T407); alcohol-related (F10, X45, X65, Y90, and Y91).
15 Given the infrequency of cannabis related admissions, in Table 1 we expand the geo-
graphic coverage of the sample to cover metropolitan local authorities in Greater
Manchester, Merseyside, theWest Midlands, Tyne and Wear, and South Yorkshire, in ad-
dition to London that ourmain analysis is based on. This covers accounts for approximate-
ly 30% of England's population. We exclude Lambeth from this analysis to prevent any
impact of the LCWS contaminating these results. For Class-A drug admissions, we include
episodes thatmention Class-A drugs as either a primary or secondary diagnosis, as the ob-
jective is to assess correlations in drug use, not the cause of admission. We exclude those
admitted for more than one risky behavior related to cannabis, Class-A drugs and alcohol.
Finally, observations for 1999 are dropped to ensure that we only capture new incidents
between 1997 and 8 and the later time period.
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25–34 year-olds reporting to have used cannabis in the month prior to
the survey. The corresponding ﬁgures for Class-A drug use are just 4%
and 2% respectively (Condon and Smith, 2003). The HES records show
that there are seven times as many inpatient hospital admissions for
Class-A drugs than for cannabis. This reinforces the notion that cannabis
related policing policies such as the LCWS,may not lead to a rise in statis-
tically detectable cannabis related to hospital admissions even if there is a
substantial increase in cannabis usage caused by the policy.
What is important for our analysis is that a body of evidence sug-
gests the cannabis and Class-A drugmarkets are linked: while little is
known about such potential linkages on the supply side, on the de-
mand side this might be because cannabis users are more likely to
consume Class-A drugs, both contemporaneously and in the future.
There are of course multiple explanations for this positive correla-
tion between admissions for cannabis and subsequent usage of
Class-A drugs. One explanation is state dependence so that cannabis
users have particular characteristics that also lead them to subse-
quently misuse Class-A drugs, a channel shown to be of ﬁrst order
importance using data from the NLSY97 by Deza (2011). Alternative-
ly, the use of cannabis might act as a causal gateway to the use of
harder drugs, has been suggested by Beenstock and Rahav (2002);
van Ours (2003); Bretteville-Jensen et al. (2008) and Melberg et al.
(2010).
Clearly the empirical debate on the relative importance of state de-
pendence and gateway impacts is far from settled. For our study what
is important is that some correlation between the market sizes for
cannabis and other illicit drugs exists, be it either because of state de-
pendence or gateway effects. To show the relatedness between these
markets as recorded in the hospital admission records we exploit, we
present descriptive evidence from the HES to suggest how cannabis
consumption today might correlate to Class-A drug use in the future.
To do so we exploit the individual identiﬁers in the administrative re-
cords, allowing us to track the same person over time.We then calculate
the probability, conditional on an admission in 1997 or 1998, of being
readmitted to hospital at least once between 2000 and 2004. Four
groups of admission are considered: (i) “cannabis admissions”, who
were admitted for cannabis; (ii) “Class-A admissions”, whowere admit-
ted for the use of a harder drug; (iii) “alcohol admissions”, who were
admitted for alcohol-related diagnoses; (iv) “all other admissions”,
who were admitted for any other cause and serve as a benchmark for
the persistence of ill-health over these time periods. Table 1 shows themeanand standard deviation for each probability of readmission, condi-
tional on prior admissions.15
Two points are of note. First, there is substantial persistence in hos-
pital admissions for the same risky behavior, as shown on the leading
diagonal in Columns 1–3. Persistence is particularly high for Class-A
drugs and alcohol, where 26 and 23% of individuals respectively, were
readmitted for the ill-effects of the same risky behavior over the two
time periods. Reading across the last row of Table 1 on subsequent read-
mission to hospital from 2000 to 2004 for any diagnosis unrelated to
drugs or alcohol, we see that this readmission probability is between
15 and 28% conditional on having been previously admitted in 1997–8
for some risky behavior related to illicit drug or alcohol use. Second,
although admissions for any form of risky behavior in 2000–4 is best
predicted by admission for the same behavior in 1997–8, we note that
for those admitted for Class-A drugs in 2000–4, 5.4% will have been ad-
mitted for cannabis related diagnoses in 1997–8. This is signiﬁcantly
higher than having been previously admitted for alcohol-related diag-
noses (2.2%) over the same period. This highlights the particularly
robust correlation between cannabis use at a given moment in time,
and future hospital admissions for Class-A related drug use.
In this paper our focus is on establishing whether a change in police
enforcement in the cannabismarket— as embodied in the LCWS— has a
causal impact on hospital admissions for Class-A drugs. The evidence
presented in Table 1 and the existing evidence documenting a linkage
between cannabis consumption on the subsequent use of other illicit
substances, suggests that as long as the policy affects the usage of
cannabis consumption in some way, this is likely to have a knockon
effect on the usage of Class-A drugs in the long run. It is these longer
term effects on public health that we now focus on.
Table 2
Hospital admission counts by male age cohort, diagnosis, borough and time period.
Number of individuals admitted into hospital, by cohort-borough-time period cells.
Male age cohort Diagnosis Pre-policy Post-policy
Rest of London Lambeth Rest of London Lambeth
15–24 Class-A drug .722 1.30 3.79 7.53
Cannabis .339 .942 1.53 3.16
Alcohol 2.40 3.30 10.8 14.6
25–34 Class-A drug 3.14 11.5 6.25 17.6
Cannabis .475 2.59 .978 3.13
Alcohol 6.34 15.2 22.1 40.9
35–44 Class-A drug 2.75 15.3 4.20 13.0
Cannabis .309 2.94 .625 1.89
Alcohol 12.8 38.1 31.6 61.6
Notes: The table shows the number of men admitted to hospital for each diagnosis, by age cohort, time period and borough. Each count data includes diagnoses for primary and secondary
causes. Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. The unit of
observation is the number of admissions per borough-quarter-year, averaged across quarters for all boroughs and years in each cell. The pre-policy period from Q1 1997 to Q2 2001.
The post-policy period runs from Q3 2003 to Q4 2009. The rest of London refers to all other London boroughs excluding Lambeth. The ICD-10 classiﬁcations used for each diagnosis are
as follows: Class-A drug related (F11, F14, F16, T400–T406, T408–T409, R781–R785); Cannabis related (F12, T407); and alcohol-related (F10, X45, X65, Y90, and Y91).
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To measure the impact of the depenalization policy on hospital
admissions rates, we estimate the following balanced panel data speci-
ﬁcation for diagnosis d in borough b in quarter q and year y,
Admitdbqy ¼ α þ β0Pqy þ β1 Lb  Pqy
h i
þ β2PPqy þ β3 Lb  PPqy
h i
þ δXbqy þ λb þ λq þ ubqy;
ð2Þ
where Admitdbqy is the number of admissions to hospital where the pri-
mary diagnosis relates to Class-A drugs, per thousand of the population
as deﬁned in Eq. (1). Pqy and PPqy are dummies for the policy and post-
policy periods respectively and Lb is a dummy for Lambeth. The speciﬁ-
cation is estimated separately for each age–gender cohort, where the
cohort's age is deﬁned as its age on the eve of the introduction of the
LCWS policy.
β0 captures London-wide cohort trends (excluding Lambeth's
neighbors) in hospitalization rates occurring at the same time as the
LCWS was in operation in Lambeth. β2 captures longer term London-
wide cohort trends in hospitalization rates for the age cohort after the
depenalization policy in Lambeth ofﬁcially ends. This coefﬁcient mostly
picks up the natural time proﬁle of any change in hospitalizations as
the cohort ages say because of varying usages of illicit substances, or
changes in susceptibility to the same levels of usage. These coefﬁcients
also partly pick up any impacts on hospitalization rates related to
diagnosis-d for London andnationwide policies, including the nationwide
depenalization of cannabis possession that occurred from January 2004
through to January 2009.16 The parameters of interest are estimated
using a standard difference-in-difference research design: β1 and β3
capture differential changes in hospital admission rates for a given
age cohort, in Lambeth during and after the depenalization policy
period, relative to other London boroughs excluding Lambeth's16 The seeds of the nationwide decriminalization policy were sown in October 2001 —
during the initial six month phase of the LCWS — when the then Home Secretary, David
Blunkett, asked the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) to review the legal
classiﬁcation of cannabis within the UK's three-tiered system. In March 2002 ACMD rec-
ommended that cannabis be declassiﬁed to a Class-C drug, because the existing Class-B
classiﬁcation was, “disproportionate in relation both to its inherent toxicity, and that of
other substances…currently within class B”. In March 2002 the Parliamentary Home Af-
fairs Select Committee supported such a declassiﬁcation and cannabis was formally
declassiﬁed from a Class-B drug to a Class-C drug in the UK on January 29th 2004. This de-
classiﬁcation effectively decriminalized the possession of small quantities of cannabis for
personal use, mirroring the LCWS policy experiment and also applied to juveniles. Like
the LCWS, the nationwide policy would be reversed — on January 26th 2009 as concerns
grew over the potential links between cannabis use and mental health, and changes in
the composition of psychoactive ingredients in cannabis supply.neighbors. Our research design identiﬁes whether: (i) hospitalization
rates in Lambeth signiﬁcantly diverge away from London-wide
cohort trends during and after the depenalization policy is in place;
and (ii) these divergences coincide with the depenalization policy's
operation in Lambeth.
In Xbqywe control for two sets of borough-speciﬁc time varying char-
acteristics. The ﬁrst contains the shares of the population under 5 and
over 75 (by borough and year),whoplace the heaviest burden onhealth
services. Second, Xbqy includes controls for admission rates, by borough-
quarter-cohort, for conditions that should be unaffected by the LCWS, in
particular malignant neoplasms, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of
the circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system, and diseases
of the digestive system. These capture contemporaneous changes in
healthcare provision or levels of illness in the population that could af-
fect drug-related admissions. The admission rates for these diagnoses
are all constructed from the HES administrative records. The ﬁxed
effects capture remaining permanent differences in admissions by bor-
ough (λb) and quarter (λq). Observations are weighed by borough
shares of the London-wide population. Deﬁning t as quarters since
April 1997: t= [4 × (y− 1997)] + q, we assume a Prais–Winsten bor-
ough speciﬁc AR(1) error structure, ubqy = ubt= ρbubt − 1 + ebt, where
ebt is a classical error term. ubqy is borough speciﬁc heteroskedastic, and
contemporaneously correlated across boroughs.17
Aswith any difference-in-difference research design, the coefﬁcients
of interest measure causal impacts only under some identifying as-
sumptions. First, we have to assume common trends in hospitalization
rates between Lambeth and the rest of London. We later present
evidence to establish whether there is any evidence of such convergent/
divergent trends in the pre-policy period, andwe also estimate our base-
line speciﬁcations allowing for borough speciﬁc linear time trends.
Second, we require that there is no ‘Ashenfelter dip’, which might other-
wise indicate that the policy was introduced in response to divergent/
convergent hospitalization rates between Lambeth and the rest of
London. The descriptive time series evidence presented belowhelps ame-
liorate this concern. Third,we require there to beno confounding changes
on the supply side of medical care impacting hospital admissions for
Class-A drug use, nor any other confounding policies impacting such17 While we think it is important to try and control for the general state of health within
the borough using the variables described in Xbqy, ourmain results are robust to excluding
such controls. Of the health conditions controlled for, there might be some concerns that
prolonged cannabis use is correlated to particular respiratory problems. We note that
dropping this control leaves our baseline estimates virtually unchanged (at least to two
decimal places on the coefﬁcients of interest). We also note that estimating AR(1) error
terms is the most conservative approach: allowing standard errors to be clustered either
by borough or by borough-year leads to far smaller estimates of standard errors for the
main results, as discussed in the Appendix (Table A3).
96 E. Kelly, I. Rasul / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 89–114outcomes. We later provide descriptive evidence to show how the
availability of health care in Lambeth for such diagnoses changed
over time. We also show the impacts of the LCWS on Class-A admis-
sions in Lambeth prior to the introduction of the nationwide
depenalization policy in 2004. Fourth, we require that there is no dif-
ferential change in the underlying populations who are resident in
Lambeth and the rest of London that might drive divergences in hos-
pitalization rates for Class-A admissions. Given our hospitalization rates
are based on borough of residence and not borough of treatment, we
later discuss, given the available evidence, the plausibility of individualsMales Aged 35-44
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Fig. 1. Time series for Class-A drug related hospital admission rates formale cohorts. Notes: Pane
in the cohort where the primary diagnosis refers to a Class-A drug. Class-A drugs include cocain
running through quarter 2 the following year. The solid black line gives admission rates for Lam
horts are deﬁned by age on 1st July 2001. The dashed vertical lines in eachﬁgure signify the start
of Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of the population in the cohort where th
Lambeth, and the solid gray line gives the averages across the remaining boroughswith high dru
There are nine such boroughs: Bexley, Bromley, Camden, Croydon, Greenwich, Kensington andwith differing propensities for drug use changing their borough of resi-
dence in response to the policy.
3.4. Descriptive evidence
3.4.1. Hospitalization counts
Table 2 shows the rawcount data (Totdbqy) for the average number of
hospital admissions for diagnosis d, that occur in borough b in quarter q
in year y, covering diagnoses related to the use of illicit substances such
as Class-A drugs and cannabis, as well as for alcohol (in each case weMales Aged 35-44
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l A plots thenumber of Class-Adrug relatedhospital admissions per 1000 of thepopulation
e, opioids, and hallucinogens. Year denotes year beginning in quarter 3 (June) of that year,
beth. The solid gray line gives the averages across the remaining 31 London boroughs. Co-
and end of the periodwhen the LCWSwas ofﬁcially in place. Panel B also plots the number
e primary diagnosis refers to a Class-A drug. The solid black line gives admission rates for
g admission pre-policy (an average of 0.08 per quarter or higher in the pre-policy period).
Chelsea, Lewisham, Southwark, and Westminster.
18 Boroughs are deﬁned to have a high drug admission rate if their average admission
rate for all age 15–44 in the pre-policy period exceeds .08 pre-policy, that is just above
the mean rate pre-policy. These nine boroughs are Bexley, Bromley, Camden, Croydon,
Greenwich, Kensington and Chelsea, Lewisham, Southwark and Westminster.
Table 3
Class-A drug related hospital admission rates for male cohorts, by borough and time period.
Means, standard deviations in parentheses, standard errors in square brackets.
Lambeth Rest of London Post-policy minus pre-policy
(1) Pre-policy (2) Post-policy (3) Pre-policy (4) Post-policy (5) Unconditional (6) Fixed effects
Men aged 15–24 .037 .131 .028 .069 .054⁎⁎ .054⁎⁎
(.067) (.082) (.049) (.074) [.022] [.022]
Men aged 25–34 .179 .259 .084 .086 .079⁎⁎ .080⁎⁎
(.103) (.127) (.094) (.086) [.034] [.034]
Men aged 35–44 .362 .311 .069 .061 −.039 −.039
(.122) (.186) (.088) (.080) [.065] [.065]
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 17 30 459 810 – –
Notes: The dependent variable is the number ofmale Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of themale population in the cohort, where the primary diagnosis refers to a Class-
A drug. Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All observations are
at the borough-quarter-year level, and areweighted by the population of the borough relative to the population of London. In Columns 1 and 3 the pre-policy period runs fromQ1 1997 to
Q2 2001. The policy period runs fromQ3 2001 to Q2 2002. In Columns 2 and 4 the post-policy period runs fromQ3 2001 to Q4 2009. In Columns 3 and 4 the sample is based on all London
boroughs excluding Lambeth and boroughsneighboring Lambeth. In Columns 5 and6, standard errors ondifferences are calculated assuming a Prais–Winstenborough speciﬁc AR(1) error
structure, that allows for borough speciﬁc heteroskedasticity and error terms to be contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. In Column 6 the differences are calculated from a
regression speciﬁcation that also controls for borough and quarter ﬁxed effects.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
97E. Kelly, I. Rasul / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 89–114show the sum of primary and secondary diagnoses). We break down
admission numbers for Lambeth and the rest of London, averaging
over the pre-policy and post-policy periods. Given that hospitalization
rates for such diagnoses are higher for men than women, Table 2 pre-
sents the data for three male age cohorts, where age is deﬁned on the
eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy. Three points are of note.
First, admission rates for Class-A related diagnoses are low in absolute
numbers in the pre-policy period for all age cohorts. These low levels
of baseline counts imply that large percentage increases can be generat-
ed by a small change in the absolute number of admissions related to
the use of Class-A drugs. Second, for the younger two age cohorts, ad-
mission numbers for Class-A diagnoses rise dramatically post-policy.
In each case, the absolute increase between the post- and pre-policy pe-
riods is larger in Lambeth than the rest of London average (despite Lam-
beth having higher admission counts than other London boroughs pre-
policy for all age cohorts). For the oldest cohort, those aged 35–44 on
the eve of the LCWS policy, the count data suggest a slight fall in
Class-A admissions in Lambeth but a rise in the average for the rest of
London. These broad descriptive patterns in absolute counts will be
replicated later in the formal analysis when Eq. (2) is estimated for
admission rates.
The third point of note from Table 2 on counts relates to diagnoses
for cannabis or alcohol.We see that for eachmale age cohort, admission
counts for cannabis related diagnosis are considerably rarer than for
Class-A related diagnoses, and this remains true post-policy. As argued
above, using these administrative records on hospital admissions, it is
therefore considerably harder to statistically detect any signiﬁcant im-
pact of the LCWS on cannabis use through hospitalizations for cannabis.
In contrast, we see that alcohol-relatedhospital admissions are themost
frequent for all age cohorts: pre-policy, there are around four times as
many such admissions in London on average than for Class-A related
diagnoses. Given the body of existing evidence on potential interlinkages
between the use of cannabis, Class-A drugs and alcohol, we later examine
whether the depenalizationpolicy had any impact onhospital admissions
involving alcohol-related diagnoses.
3.4.2. Unconditional impacts of hospitalization rates
The core outcome considered in the empirical analysis is hospital ad-
missions rates as deﬁned in Eq. (1). Fig. 1A shows the time series for
hospital admission rates in Lambeth against the rest of London averages,
for each male age cohort. Each ﬁgure is centered on the time of policy
change in Lambeth: the dashed red lines indicate the start and end points
of the ofﬁcial period of operation of the LCWS policy. Each time series is
averaged annually. In order to line up with the policy period, each yearstarts from Q3 of that year and averages to Q2 in the following year (so
for example the value for 1997 is the average over 1997Q3–1998Q2). Al-
though the time series for Lambeth is quite volatile, three points emerge
from the comparisonwith other Londonboroughs: (i) there is no system-
atic difference in pre-trends between Lambeth and the rest of London at
least for the two older age cohorts, nor is there any evidence of an
‘Ashenfelter dip’ in admission rates in Lambeth just prior to the introduc-
tion of the LCWS; (ii) there are divergences in admission rates in Lambeth
relative to the rest of London for each age cohort; and (iii) London wide
time series in hospital admission rates appear rather ﬂat and not trending
upwards or downwards, certainly for the two older age cohorts. Fig. 1B
repeats the ﬁgures comparing Lambeth only to other boroughs with a
similarly (high) incidence of Class-A drug related hospital admission
pre-policy. The same broad patterns can be seen in the three time series
for each male age cohort in Lambeth against this control group.18
Table 3 then provides descriptive evidence on the unconditional
long termeffects of the depenalization policy on Class-A related hospital
admission rates, with each row showing hospital admission rates
(Admitdbqy) as deﬁned in Eq. (1). We again ﬁrst focus on male cohorts
of various ages on the eve of the LCWS policy. Columns 1 and 2 present
mean hospital admission rates related to Class-A drug usage in Lambeth
during the pre-policy and post-policy periods respectively; Columns 3
and 4 give the corresponding statistics for the average borough in
the rest of London (excluding Lambeth's neighboring boroughs). Pre-
policy, Lambeth had substantially higher rates of admissions than the
London average. Indeed, in ranking boroughs by their per-policy hospi-
tal admission rates related to Class-A drugs, Lambeth has the third
highest for men and the second highest for women. However, as sug-
gested in Fig. 1 and shown more formally later, there is no evidence of
diverging or converging trends in Class-A related hospital admission
rates between Lambeth and the London average in thepre-policy period
from 1997 to 2001. In Lambeth, admission rates in the pre-policy period
are lowest for the youngest cohort, reﬂecting the overall pattern of drug
admissions by age.
Comparing Columns 1 and 2 re-iterates the basic pattern of potential
health impacts of the depenalization policy, that was previously shown
in the raw counts data in Table 2: hospital admission rates in Lambeth
rise over time for the 15–24 and 25–34 cohorts, but fall slightly for the
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for the youngest cohort and are stable or declining for the older two age
cohorts.
Columns 5 and 6 then present difference-in-difference estimates of
how Class-A drug admission rates relate to the LCWS policy. Column 5
shows that unconditional on any other factor, admission rates for both
the 15–24 and 25–34 cohorts signiﬁcantly rise in Lambeth relative to
the London borough average, after the introduction of the policy to
depenalize the possession of cannabis. The relative increases in admission
rates of .054 and .079 per thousand population for the youngest two age
cohorts are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level: the increases corre-
spond to a 146% rise relative to the pre-policy level for the 15–24 cohort,
and a 44% increase above the baseline level for the cohort aged 25–34 on
the eve of the policy. The effect for the oldest cohort is not statistically sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero. Column 6 then shows this basic pattern of
difference-in-differences to remain in magnitude and signiﬁcance once
borough and quarter year ﬁxed effects are controlled for. These results
suggest that among younger male age cohorts, the policy of depenalizing
the possessionof cannabis is associatedwith signiﬁcantly higher hospital-
ization rates in Lambeth for Class-A drug use in the longer term.
Table A1 shows the corresponding results for female age cohorts:we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impacts on Class-A related hospitalization for any
female age cohort. The rate of admissions for such diagnoses among
women is generally lower than among men and this might be one rea-
son that it is harder to statistically detect any impact at conventional sig-
niﬁcance levels. At the same time, the fact that there are very different
trends in hospitalizations for Class-A drugs across genders within
Lambeth, suggests that the earlier results formen are notmerely picking
up other changes in hospital behavior or how diagnoses are recorded
within Lambeth, that might otherwise have been expected to impact
men and women equally.
Table A2 shows the corresponding descriptive evidence for hospital
admissions related to cannabis use for male cohorts. Cannabis hospital
admission rates are generally lower than for Class-A drugs, especially
among older age cohorts, despite much higher levels of cannabis usageTable 4
The impact of the LCWS on hospital admission rates for Class-A drug diagnoses.
Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related diagnoses.
Male age cohort (1) Aged 15–24 (2) Aged 25–34
Post-policy × Lambeth .0380⁎ .0749⁎⁎
(.0229) (.0334)
Policy period × Lambeth .0282 −.0288
(.0396) (.0606)
Post-policy .0289⁎⁎⁎ −.00715
(.00609) (.00707)
Policy period .00986 −.0227⁎⁎⁎
(.00765) (.00775)
Mean of dependent variable, Lambeth pre-policy .037 .179
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes
Linear borough speciﬁc time trend No No
Adjusted R-squared .256 .395
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 1428 1428
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1
Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age
borough-quarter-year level, and areweighted by thepopulation of the borough relative to thep
dummy variable is equal to one from Q3 2001 to Q2 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy
admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Control boroughs are all other London boro
Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten regression,where a boroug
heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations areweighted
the borough. Columns 1 and 4 relate to admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Column
to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001. All speciﬁcations include borough and qua
borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year level admissions formalignant neoplasm, diseas
and diseases of the digestive system. These admission rates are derived from the HES administ
linear borough speciﬁc time trend.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.as suggested by survey data. The difference-in-difference results suggest
the LCWS had no signiﬁcant impact on hospital admissions for cannabis:
the point estimates for the youngest male cohorts are positive but not
precisely estimated, and a similar set of ﬁndings is obtained when exam-
ining the impact of the depenalization policy on hospitalizations for can-
nabis related diagnoses among female cohorts (not shown).
To relate these ﬁndings to the literature, recall that Model (1993)
ﬁnd that the de facto decriminalization of cannabis in twelve US states
from themid-1970s signiﬁcantly increased cannabis-related emergency
room admissions. Chu (2012) similarlyﬁnds that the passage of US state
laws that allow individuals to use cannabis for medical purposes leads
to a signiﬁcant increase in referred treatments to rehabilitation centers.
Our evidence from London suggests that if a similar effect occurs from
the depenalization of cannabis possession, it does not then feed through
to signiﬁcantly higher rates of hospitalization that involve extreme con-
sequences on health leading to overnight hospital stays, which is what
our inpatient administrative data measures. For the bulk of our core
analysis, we therefore continue to focus on Class-A drug-related hospi-
tal admissions among men.
4. Baseline results
4.1. The impact of the LCWS by cohort
Table 4 presents estimates of the full baseline speciﬁcation (2),
where we consider the impact of the LCWS on Class-A drug related hos-
pital admission rates for threemale age cohorts in Columns 1 to 3. These
ﬁndings represent our core results: they show that the addition of time
varying borough controls (Xbqy) produces estimates very similar to the
unconditional estimates shown in Table 2. The ﬁrst row shows that in
the longer term post-policy period, there are statistically signiﬁcant
rises in admission rates of .038 and .075 for the youngest two cohorts
in Lambeth, relative to other non-neighboring London boroughs. In
line with the earlier descriptive evidence, no policy impact is found on
the oldest age cohort, who were aged 34–44 on the eve of the LCWS's(3) Aged 35–44 (4) Aged 15–24 (5) Aged 25–34 (6) Aged 35–44
−.0339 .0593 .137⁎⁎ .211⁎⁎
(.0626) (.0411) (.0617) (.103)
−.156 .0364 (.0131) (.0549)
(.104) (.0397) (.0595) (.0964)
.000513 .00576 .00459 .0465⁎⁎
(.00766) (.0133) (.0176) (.0189)
−.0123 .000577 (.00794) .0219⁎
(.00892) (.00900) (.0118) (.0127)
.362 .037 .179 .362
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes Yes Yes
.435 .320 .424 .504
1428 1428 1428 1428
000 of the population in the cohort where the primary diagnosis refers to a Class-A drug.
on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All observations are at the
opulation of London. The sample period runs fromQ21997 until Q4 2009. The policy period
dummy is equal to one from Q3 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. Column 1 relates to
ughs, excluding Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon, Merton, Southwark and Wandsworth).
h speciﬁc AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough speciﬁc
by the share of the total (excluding neighboring boroughs) London population that year in
s 2 and 5 relate to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001. Columns 3 and 6 relate
rter ﬁxed effects, and control for shares of the population aged under 5 and over 75 at the
es of the eye and ear, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system,
rative records at the borough-quarter-year level. Columns 4 to 6 additionally control for a
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to the mean admission rate in Lambeth pre-policy as reported at the
foot of Table 4, the percentage increases conditional on other factors
are 103% for the youngest age cohort, and 42% for those men aged 25–
34 on the eve of the policy, which are slightly smaller than the uncondi-
tional percentages reported in relation to Table 3.
The second row of Table 4 shows that in the short-run, during the
13 months inwhich the LCWSwas actually in operation, there are no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant effects on hospitalization rates for any cohort. Hence,
as might be expected, any impact of the cannabis depenalization policy
on hospitalization rates for Class-A drug use takes time to work through
(in line with the descriptive evidence in Table 1). Table 4 also shows
the estimates of β0 and β2. These highlight that for London as a whole
(excluding Lambeth's neighbors), there are no signiﬁcant long-term
time cohort trends in admission rates during and after the policy period
for the older two cohorts. For the youngest cohort aged 15–24 (column
1), hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related admissions are
naturally rising over time as the cohort ages, but the results overall
show that hospitalization rates in Lambeth are signiﬁcantly diverging
away from this London-wide average in the post-policy period, all else
equal.
To assess whether thesemagnitudes are plausible, we note ﬁrst that
all the evidence in Adda et al. (2013) points to an increased use of can-
nabis as a result of the LCWS policy, an impact that lasted well after the
policy ofﬁcially ended (in part because as discussed in Section 2, polic-
ing strategy did not revert back identically to what it had been pre-
policy). They estimate the size of the cannabis market to have increased
by around 60% in Lambeth. For this to translate into a large percentage
increase in hospital admissions for Class-A diagnoses would not require
a large increase in the absolute number of such cases because the raw
number of counts for hospital admissions by borough-quarter-year are
low to begin with. More precisely, this pattern of signiﬁcant policy im-
pacts is robust to using the absolute number of admissions (Totdbqy) as
the dependent variable. In this case, the coefﬁcient of interest β3 is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level for the two younger male cohorts
(the coefﬁcient is 1.71 for those aged 15–24 on the eve of the policy,
and is 3.44 for those aged 25–34).19 The Appendix also presents esti-
mates of the baseline speciﬁcation using Tobit speciﬁcations, that
show the robustness of the ﬁndings to treating differently borough-
quarter-year observations with zero admissions (Table A4).
Taken together, our results suggest that the depenalization of canna-
bis led to longer term increases in the use of Class-A drugs and subse-
quent hospitalizations related to Class-A drug use among the two
youngest aged cohorts on the eve of the LCWS policy. If depenalization
led to a decline in the equilibrium price of cannabis in Lambeth, as is
often argued to be an unambiguous effect of such policies (Kilmer
et al., 2010), then this result suggests that cannabis and Class-A drugs
have a negative cross-price elasticity, so that the two types of illicit
drug are contemporaneous complements, or the use of cannabis leads
through some mechanism to the later use of harder illicit drugs.20 This
would be in line with some other studies that have estimated the
cross-price elasticity between cannabis and a speciﬁc Class-A drug:
cocaine, either using decriminalization as a proxy for a price reduction
(Thies and Register, 1993; Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998), or using
actual price information (Williams et al., 2004).
An obvious concern with these results is that they might in part be
confounded by natural time trends, by age cohort, in hospitalization
rates for Class-A drugs, that are not fully being captured in the policy19 We also note the robustness of ﬁndings to using a third dependent variable,
the log of the number of Class-A related admissions per 1000 of the population
plus one, Ln TotdbqyPopby þ 1
 
. In this case, β3 is again positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level for the two younger male cohorts (the coefﬁcient is .034 for those aged
15–24 on the eve of the policy, and is .059 for those aged 25–34).
20 No reliable information on the price of illicit drugs exists at the borough level for our
study period.and post-policy dummies. To address this, we repeat the analysis but
augment (2) with controls for borough speciﬁc linear time trends.
Columns 4 to 6 in Table 4 present the results for each male age cohort
when time trends are conditioned on. We ﬁnd that for the two older
male age cohorts, hospitalization rates are signiﬁcantly higher in
Lambeth relative to the rest of London comparing the post- and pre-
policy periods. Hence policy impacts remain even once linear within
borough time trends are controlled for, although we note the descrip-
tive evidence in Fig. 1 does not provide compelling evidence that such
time trends should necessarily be controlled for.
In summary the evidence suggests that there are signiﬁcant impacts
of the police policy of depenalizing cannabis on public health, as mea-
sured in hospitalization rates for Class-A related drug use. These impacts
are quantitatively large, apply tomore than onemale age cohort, and are
observed well after the policy depenalizing the possession of cannabis is
ofﬁcially ended. To be clear, these results cannot be interpreted as sug-
gesting that there are some individuals that start taking Class-A drugs
as a result of the depenalization of cannabis. All we can infer is that
there are individuals, who prior to the policy might either have not
been consuming illicit drugs at all, or were consuming them in quantities
that did not lead to hospitalization,who are then in the longer termpost-
policy, signiﬁcantly impacted by the depenalization policy so as to re-
quire hospitalization for diagnoses related to Class-A drug use.
4.2. Robustness checks
We now present evidence to underpin the credibility of the
difference-in-difference research design. These relate to probing the
data to: (i) check for pre-existing divergent trends in hospitalization
rates between Lambeth and other London boroughs; (ii) evaluate the
robustness of the results to alternative control boroughs to compare
Lambeth to; (iii) examine whether differential changes over time in
health care provision between Lambeth and other locations, or other
policies impacting hospitalizations for Class-A drug use, could confound
the results, and; (iv) shed light on whether individuals changed bor-
ough of residence in response to the policy.
4.2.1. Pre-trends
The research design implicitly assumes that in the absence of the
depenalization policy, there would have been no natural divergence/
convergence in admission rates between Lambeth and the rest of
London. The previous set of speciﬁcations that allowed for borough spe-
ciﬁc time trends already partly addressed this concern. A secondway to
address the issue is to exploit the four years of panel data prior to the in-
troduction of the depenalization policy, from 1997 Q2 until 2001 Q2,
using this period to test whether there is any evidence of a divergence
in trends in hospitalization rates between Lambeth and the rest of
London pre-policy. To do so, we estimate a speciﬁcation analogous to
Eq. (2) in the pre-policy sample but allow for only one split of the sam-
ple, midway through the pre-policy period.We then test whether there
are divergent trends across Lambeth and the rest of London in admis-
sion rates between the ﬁrst and second halves of the pre-policy period.
As Table A5 shows (and consistent with the descriptive evidence in
Fig. 1), for all male age cohorts this pre-policy sample split dummy
interaction is not signiﬁcantly different from zero suggesting that hospi-
talization rates in Lambeth are not diverging from London in the years
prior to the depenalization policy. As discussed in Section 2, this is
very much in line with the policy discussion around the underlying
motivation for the policy, that emphasized the policy enabling the po-
lice to reallocate their effort towards non-cannabis crime, and which
hardly mentioned the potential impacts on public health. Hence the
data supports the assertion that the depenalization policywas not intro-
duced speciﬁcally into Lambeth because of worsening public health
related to drug-related hospital admissions. Nor is there any evidence of
reversion to the mean in hospitalization rates with Lambeth converging
back towards London-wide averages. In short, any form of ‘Ashenfelter
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Age 15-24
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Fig. 2. Percentage of all individuals treated for Class-A related diagnoses in Lambeth that are residents in Lambeth.
Notes: Fig. 2 plots the share of all male individuals in the age cohort that are treated in a Lambeth hospital for Class-Adrug relatedhospital admissions, that are residents of Lambeth. Class-A
drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Age cohorts are deﬁned by age on 1st July 2001. The dashed vertical lines in each ﬁgure signify the start and end of the periodwhen the
LCWS was ofﬁcially in place. The time series for the 15–24 year old cohort starts in 1999 because for earlier years there are fewer than 10 admissions in Lambeth per quarter.
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also suggested by the descriptive evidence in Fig. 1.22 The South London and Maudsley NHS Trust is headquartered in Lambeth and was4.2.2. Control boroughs
We now examine the robustness of the ﬁndings to comparing
Lambeth to other subsets of boroughs, rather then all boroughs
London-wide (excluding only the immediate neighbors of Lambeth).
To begin with, we follow on from the descriptive evidence in Fig. 1B
and compare Lambeth to a more limited set of nine other London bor-
oughs with similarly high levels of hospital admission rates for Class-A
drugs pre-policy. As shown in Columns 1–3 of Table A6, with this
restricted comparison sample of boroughs to Lambeth, there remains
a signiﬁcant impact of the policy among males aged 25–34 on the eve
of the policy, an effect signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The point estimate of
the impact (.104) is actually larger than the corresponding coefﬁcient
in the baseline speciﬁcation (.075), as reported in column 2 of Table 4.
The remaining columns in Table A6 then show this result to be robust
to alternative modiﬁcations to the control group of boroughs included:
(i) boroughs with the very highest pre-policy admissions related to
Class-A drugs (Columns 4–6, restricting the sample to four boroughs);
(ii) including neighbors to Lambeth in the control group where spill-
overs in hospital admissions might have been greatest (Columns 7–9,
expanding the sample to 32 boroughs).
Along similar lines, the remaining columns in Table A6 consider
restricting the control group of boroughs to those in which there exists:
(i) a mental health trust headquarters (there are six such boroughs
including Lambeth); (ii) a teaching hospital (there are eight such
boroughs including Lambeth).21 The intuition for these comparisons is
that residents of such boroughs might have access to especially high
levels of quality in hospital care, or similar degrees of specialization in
dealing with mental health disorders associated with the use of illicit
drugs as in Lambeth where one mental health trust is headquartered. In
line with the baseline results, we see that there were signiﬁcant impacts
on hospitalization rates post-policy in Lambeth for the youngest two age21 An NHS Mental Health Trust provides health and social care services for people with
mental health problems in England. There are 60mental health Trusts in England. A single
trustmight covermultiple sites (such as hospitals to clinics) andwemeasure the borough
in which each trust is headquartered. The jurisdictions of Trusts do no coincide with
boundaries of boroughs.male cohorts in both these restricted samples. Taken together, these
comparisons suggest that our baseline results are not driven solely by
differences in health care between Lambeth and other London boroughs.
4.2.3. Supply side changes and other confounders
To provide further evidence on whether changes on the supply
side of health care could be driving the difference-in-difference esti-
mates, we utilize information in the HES administrative records both
on the borough of residence of the individual, and the borough of
treatment for each hospital episode. We then construct the time se-
ries for the percentage of men treated for a Class-A related diagnoses
in a Lambeth health facility (by age cohort), that actually reside in
Lambeth. To be clear, nearly all London boroughs have a hospital in
them (with a handful of boroughs containing two). However, the
specialist services required to treat diagnoses involving the use of
Class-A drugs, such as those relating to mental health, are more con-
centrated in a small subset of facilities that aremore dispersed across
London. Each of these specialist facilities would be expected to treat
patients from across London. If such services expanded in Lambeth
during the post-policy period and were especially targeted towards
Lambeth residents, then we would expect to observe, over time, a
greater share of individuals treated in Lambeth to also reside in
Lambeth.
Fig. 2 presents the relevant time series evidence on this, again split
by male age cohorts where ages are deﬁned on the eve of the policy.
Within each cohort, we ﬁnd no evidence of changes in this percentage
over time: for all male cohorts, between 30 and 40% of admissions
into hospital are from individuals that are residents of Lambeth, and
this does not change much over time. This evidence suggests that
even if medical capacity were expanding in Lambeth, it did not lead to
a differential treatment of Lambeth residents versus non-residents for
the diagnoses related to Class-A drug usage we focus on in our main
analysis.22formed in 1999. This providesmental health and substancemisuse services across Bexley,
Bromley, Croydon, Greenwich, Lambeth, Lewisham and Southwark, as well as specialist
services for patients from across the UK. Although it did see a rapid growth in patients
from its opening, some of these would be re-allocations of patients from other trusts,
and as Fig. 2 highlights, the evidence does not suggest that it targeted residents of Lambeth
(such targeting would also go against its remit).
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LCWS policy allowed the policy to reallocate their effort towards crime
involving Class-A drugs, then the impacts we have documented would
not solely be occurring through any demand side linkage between the
use of cannabis and Class-A drugs (whether it arises from unobserved
heterogeneity or state dependence via a gateway effect). However as
discussed in Section 2, the body of evidence presented in Adda et al.
(2013) suggests that the LCWS policy did not lead to a reallocation of
police resources towards crime related to Class-A drug crime (rather,
the police used the policy to reallocate their effort towards non-drug
crime). Hence, in the current study, any link between the depenalization
policy and hospitalizations for Class-A diagnoses most likely stems from
the interlinkages between the demand sides of the markets for cannabis
and Class-A drugs.
A second potential confounding factor is that between January 2004
and January 2009 cannabis was declassiﬁed from a Class-B drug to a
Class-C drug throughout the UK. This declassiﬁcation effectively
decriminalized the possession of small quantities of cannabis for person-
al use,mirroring the LCWSpolicy experiment inmanyways.23 Such a na-
tionwide policy would obviously only bias the difference-in-difference
estimates that we focus on if its impact differed between Lambeth and
other London boroughs. To show the policy impacts that we have docu-
mented between Lambeth and other London boroughs likely stem from
the localized depenalization policy that only operated in Lambeth,we re-
estimate our baseline speciﬁcation (2) using only data running up to
2003 Q4, so up to the point where the nationwide policy change oc-
curred. The result in Columns 1–3 of Table A7 show that for two out of
three male age cohorts, there are signiﬁcant impacts on hospitalization
rates for Class-A related diagnoses in Lambeth, even over this restricted
post-policy period before any changes in nationwide policy take hold.4.2.4. Residential mobility
Throughout the analysis we have used the borough of residence at
the time of admission to build hospitalization rates across cohorts. The
documented increase in hospital admissions for Class-A drug related
diagnoses in Lambeth following the introduction of the LCWS might
then operate through two mechanisms: (i) a change in behavior of
those residents in Lambeth prior to the policy; and (ii) a change in the
composition of Lambeth residents, with the policy inducing a net inﬂow
of people into the boroughwith a higher propensity for Class-A drug use.
Undoubtedly, the geographical distances between London boroughs are
small and travel costs are low relative to the ﬁxed costs of permanently
changing residence. Similarly the nationwide depenalization policy in
place between 2004 and 2009 would further have weakened incentives
for individuals to relocate residence with Lambeth in response to the
LCWS policy. However, if drug users perceive the depenalization of can-
nabis in Lambeth as signaling a wider weakening of police enforcement
against all illicit drugs, there might be longer term beneﬁts to relocating
to the borough. Given the importance of assuming the underlying popu-
lations, and hence propensity for drug use, in Lambeth and the rest of
London to remain unchanged over time in the difference-in-difference23 First, the Association of Chief Police Ofﬁcers advised ofﬁcers to give streetwarnings for
most possession cases. The police maintained the power of arrest for possession and this
was advised to be used under aggravating circumstances. The maximum penalty for pos-
session declined from 5 to 2 years with declassiﬁcation. Second, the policy was intended
to represent a permanent change in policing strategies. Third, a key reason for the change
cited by the Home Ofﬁce was that it would free up police resources to tackle higher prior-
ity Class-A drug crimes. Fourth, aswith the LCWS, the nationwide decriminalization policy
did not try to segment themarket for cannabis from that of other illicit drugs by for exam-
ple, incentivizing suppliers to switch from supplying illicit drugs in general, to cannabis in
particular. Indeed, the penalty for the supply of Class-C drugs increased at this time to co-
incidewith those for Class B drugs, to amaximumof 14 years. Finally, the nationwide pol-
icy also applied also to juveniles.Warburton et al. (2005) andMay et al. (2007) discuss the
background to this nationwide policy inmore detail. They provide descriptive evidence on
how it affected the behavior and perceptions of the police and cannabis users.design, we now try to use the administrative records to shed some
light on the extent towhich drug users relocate their residence into Lam-
beth fromother parts of London as a result of the depenalization policy.24
The HES data contain information on borough of residence for each
individual admission to hospital, with individual identiﬁers allowing
us to link patients across episodes and time. The major limitation of
using hospital administrative records to shed light on changes in
borough of residence in response to the policy, is that for those that
are admitted only once during the study period, the data does not
allow us to identify whether they have changed residence over time
prior to the admission, or will do so subsequent to the admission.
These individuals, that form the bulk of hospital admissions and that
are included in the main analysis, cannot be included in the analysis
below examining migration patterns. While this obviously limits our
ability to shed light on the potential net migration into Lambeth of
drug users in response to the depenalization policy, we know of no
data set representative at the London borough level, that would match
both changes in residence over timewith individual hospital admissions
or health outcomes over time.
We therefore proceed by documenting changes in borough of resi-
dence for those that have at least two admissions into hospital between
1997 and 2007. To get a sense of the sample selection this induces, we
note that in the pre-policy period, 326,683 men are admitted into hospi-
tal for anydiagnosis, ofwhich 10.6% are re-admitted (at least once) some-
where in London during the one-year period in which the LCWS policy is
in place, and 25.3% are re-admitted (at least once) anytime in the post-
policy period. Among those 1746 individuals admitted for Class-A drug
related diagnosis in the pre-period, only 14.7% are observed being re-
admitted for any diagnosis during the policy period, and 28.2% are ob-
served being re-admitted for any diagnosis during the post-policy period.
If individuals are induced to migrate to Lambeth in response to the
depenalization policy, they might do so at some point during its actual
period of operation between June 2001 and July 2002. To check for
this, we ﬁrst focus on those 1630 individuals that are admitted to hospi-
tal for any diagnosis in Lambeth during the policy period, and that are ob-
served having at least one prior hospital admission somewhere in
London pre-policy. Of these 1630 individuals, 1.7% are admitted for
Class-A related diagnosis in Lambeth during the policy period. These
are perhaps themost likely individuals to havemoved to Lambeth in spe-
ciﬁc response to the depenalization policy. Howeverwe note that among
this group, almost all their earlier pre-policy admissions (for any diagno-
sis) occur in Lambeth, so that there is no strong evidence of these individ-
uals having recently moved to Lambeth during the policy period.
While these results focus on those admitted for Class-A drug related
diagnosis in Lambeth during the policy period, it might well be the case
that drug users that migrate into Lambeth because of the policy are ﬁrst
admitted for some other diagnosis. Hence, we next focus on the 98.3% of
hospital admissions in Lambeth during the policy period for any diagno-
sis unrelated to Class-A drug usage. Among these individuals, nearly all
of them are observed with all their earlier admissions in Lambeth; only
10.3% have their last prior admission in some other borough, indicating
that they changed their borough of residence at some point between
their last admission and the end of the policy period. Taken together,
these two pieces of evidence show that among those men with at
least two hospital admissions since 1997, there is very limited evidence
of there being signiﬁcant changes of residence into Lambeth during the
formal policy period between June 2001 and July 2002.
Our next set of results examines longer term patterns of changes in
borough residence. Given the ﬁxed costs of changing residence and
that in the post-policy period policy enforcement in Lambeth remained
somewhat different than other boroughs, it might be reasonable to
assume that a net inﬂow of drug users into Lambeth simply takes
some time to occur. To check for this we examine whether inﬂows24 We thank Jonathan Caulkins and Libor Dusek for comments that have motivated this
subsection.
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Fig. 3. Impact of the LCWS by time-bin relative to the reform.
Notes: Each panel in this ﬁgure refers to a separate speciﬁcation, where the policy and post-policy dummies are replaced by ﬁve 2-year time-bin dummies: 2–3 years pre-reform (Q3 1998–Q2
2000); 1 year pre-reform policy and the policy period (Q3 2000–Q2 2002); 1–2 years post reform (Q3 2002–Q2 2004); 3–4 years post reform (Q3 2004–Q2 2006); and 5–6 years post reform
(Q3 2006–Q2 2008). The omitted category is the 1 year pre- and policy period category. Data pre-Q3 1998 and post-Q3 2008 onwards are excluded. Each plotted square corresponds to the
Lambeth × Time–Bin dummy coefﬁcient. The vertical green lines give the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Age refers to age on the eve of the LCWS introduction (1st July 2001).
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year windows: the ﬁrst four year window occurs entirely pre-policy
from April 1997 to April 2001, and the second four year window occurs
entirely post-policy from April 2003 to April 2007. In each window we
check whether among those admitted to hospital at least twice in the
four-year window, and, where at least one admission relates to a
diagnosis indicating Class-A drug use, whether changes in borough of
residence between the ﬁrst and last admission vary over time.
In the ﬁrst four-year pre-policy window from 1997 to 2001 we ob-
serve: (i) of those that have their ﬁrst admission outside of Lambeth,
1.4% are observed with a later admission in Lambeth; (ii) of those that
have their ﬁrst admission in Lambeth, 16% are observed with a later
admission outside of Lambeth. Doing the same for the later four-year
window from 2003 to 2007 to see if this pattern of migration is altered
in the longer term, we ﬁnd that: (i) of those that have their ﬁrst admis-
sion outside of Lambeth, 3.0% are observed with a later admission in
Lambeth; and (ii) of those that have their ﬁrst admission in Lambeth,
30% are observed with a later admission outside of Lambeth. Hence
there is evidence ofmore frequent changes of residence among this sub-
sample post-policy, but that this increase occurs both into Lambeth and
from Lambeth: the inﬂow into Lambeth from other boroughs in the
post-policy window relative to the pre-policy window increases (3.0%
relative to 1.8%), but this is offset by the percentage increase in outﬂows
from Lambeth to other boroughs among such individuals (30% relative
to 16%).25 Overall this suggests is that, among those with multiple
hospital admissions, there is increased mobility of residents across
boroughs over time, but there is no strong evidence of systematically25 One additional strategy we considered to shed light on changes in residence induced
by the policy. First, we considered using the administrative records on outpatients, that
would include visits to general practitioners and local health clinics. Such events are far
more common than hospital admissions. However such data only reliably exists in the
post-policy period from 2006/7, and contains no information on diagnosis.increased inﬂows into Lambeth over the second four year window rela-
tive to the ﬁrst.
5. Extended results
We now consider four margins of policy impact in more detail: the
dynamic responses within age cohorts over time, the heterogeneous
impacts within age cohorts by previous admission history, spillover
impacts onto hospital admissions for alcohol-related diagnoses, and
the severity of hospital admissions. Establishing the existence and
magnitude of each effect is important to feed into any assessment of
the overall social costs of this localized change in drug enforcement
policy related to the market for cannabis.
5.1. The dynamics of the response
When investigating how the impact of the depenalization policy on
hospitalizations for Class-A drugs evolves over time, our objectives are
two-fold: to assess how long the change in police enforcement for
cannabis took to ﬁlter through to hospital admissions for Class-A drug
related diagnoses, and whether, and how quickly, those effects eventu-
ally die out. To chart the time proﬁle of responses, we replace the post-
policy period indicator in Eq. (2), PPqy, with three 2-year time-bins:
1–2 years post reform (Q3 2002 toQ2 2004, TB1); 3–4 years post reform
(Q3 2004 to Q2 2006, TB2); and, 5–6 years post reform (Q3 2006 to Q2
2008, TB3). To further check for pre-trends,we also estimate the impacts
in one pre-policy period (Q3 1998 to Q2 2000, TB−1),
Admitdbqy ¼ α þ β0Pqy þ β1 Lb  Pqy
h i
þ
X3
k¼1
μkTB
k
qy þ γk Lb  TBkqy
h i 
þ μ−1TB−1qy þ γ−1 Lb  TB−1qy
h i 
þ δXbqy þ λb þ λq þ ubqy
ð3Þ
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estimated for each 10-yearmale age cohort. Impacts of LCWS on admis-
sion rates in Lambeth, in each time period (β1,γ−1 γ1, γ2, and γ3), are
then plotted in Fig. 3, where the reference category (γ0) is the two
year window covering the year prior the policy and the year the policy
is implemented. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that there are no signiﬁcant pre-
trends for any cohort (although the conﬁdence interval for the pre-
policy period is wide for the oldest cohort).
On longer term dynamics, Fig. 3 shows that for each cohort there is
an inverse-U shaped pattern of dynamic responses across time in the
post-policy period. For each cohort the depenalization policy has no
signiﬁcant impact on hospitalization rates during the policy period,
and estimated impacts increase thereafter for some time before starting
to decline. In linewith the evidence in Table 4, themagnitude of the im-
pacts are largest for those in the younger two cohorts aged 15–24 and
25–34 on the eve of the policy. For these age cohorts: (i) the impacts
on hospitalizations related to Class-A drug use take a year or two to
emerge after the policy is ﬁrst initiated; and (ii) the post-policy impacts
are the highest three to four years into the post-policy period,where the
peak impacts correspond to a near doubling of admission rates relative
to the pre-policy period for each cohort.
Although the pattern of coefﬁcients for the oldest cohort also follows
an inverse-U shape, the sign of the point estimates is quite different
by the ﬁnal period considered: 4–6 years into the post-policy period,
there is a signiﬁcant and negative impact on hospitalization rates. This
might in part be driven by a different link between the consumption
of cannabis and Class-A for those in this age cohort.
In comparison to the literature linking policies regulating themarket
for illicit drugs and public health, all of these dynamic responses are of
signiﬁcant duration. For example, Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) study
the impact of a government program designed to reduce the supply of
methamphetamine on hospitalization rates (by targeting precursors to
methamphetamine), as well as other outcomes. This policy isTable 5
The impact of the LCWS bymale age cohort and admission history.
Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related diagnoses.
Male age cohort Aged 15–24 Aged 25–34
Pre-policy drugs or alcohol admissions No No
(1) (2)
Post-policy × Lambeth .0157 .0873
(.0291) (.0646)
Policy period × Lambeth
Post-policy .0140⁎ .0156⁎⁎
(.00719) (.00745)
Policy period
Mean of dependent variable, Lambeth pre-policy 0 0
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .327 .413
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 952 952
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1–3 is the number of Class-A drug related hospital ad
Class-A drug. Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, andhallucinogens.Male age cohorts are deﬁ
variable in Columns 4–6 is the number of admissions for Class A drugs among men who were
admitted for drugs or alcohol-related diagnoses in a given borough and quarter during the pr
by the population of the borough relative to the population of London. The policy period du
policy dummy is equal to one from Q3 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The sample in Co
2009. Columns 4 to 5 restrict hospital admission rates to be constructed from those individual
4 to 6 then runs from Q2 1997 until Q4 2009. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs
corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten regression, where a borough s
heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are weigh
year in the borough. Columns 1 and 4 relates to admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 20
3 and 6 relate to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001. All speciﬁcations include b
and over 75 at the borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year level admissions for malign
the respiratory system, and diseases of the digestive system. These admission rates are derived
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.sometimes claimed to have been the DEA's greatest success in
disrupting the supply of an illicit drug in the US and indeed Dobkin
andNicosia (2009)ﬁnd that the policy had signiﬁcant impacts on public
health. However, they document that these effects were short lived:
within 18 months admission rates had returned to pre-intervention
levels. In contrast, the depenalization policy we document has an im-
pact on hospitalization rates that lasts at least 3–4 years post-policy
for two of the three male cohorts even though the policy itself is only
formally in place for a year.
5.2. Admission histories
We next examine how the long run policy impacts are heteroge-
neous within the same age cohort. To do so, we exploit the full richness
of the administrative records to consider differing impacts by individual
histories of hospital admission for drug and alcohol-related diagnoses
during the pre-policy period from April 1997 to June 2001. This allows
us to shed light onwhether thosewith a prior record of heavy substance
abuse, respond differentially to the depenalization of cannabis than
does the rest of the population. Relative to the existing literature linking
drug enforcement policies and health, exploiting this aspect of the data
allows us to present novel evidence on the characteristics of themargin-
al individuals most impacted by a policy of depenalizing cannabis.
Examining heterogeneous impacts along this margin is informative be-
cause previous heavy users of illicit drugs might be engaged in habitual
behaviors so there is less scope for further increases in hospitalization
rates for Class-A related diagnoses.
We construct admission histories related to the use of either
illicit drugs or alcohol, and create panels by borough-quarter-age
cohort-gender, based on those with and without pre-policy histories
of admissions related to drugs or alcohol (the latter group is of course
orders of magnitude larger than the former group). Among those with
no pre-policy admissions, we calculate admission rates as in Eq. (1), soAged 35–44 Aged 15–24 Aged 25–34 Aged 35–44
No Yes Yes Yes
(3) (4) (5) (6)
.160⁎⁎ 0.00390 −0.00206 −0.00812⁎⁎⁎
(.0776) (0.00414) (0.00147) (0.00130)
0.00179 −0.00115 −0.00567⁎⁎
(0.00725) (0.00287) (0.00238)
.0148⁎⁎ −0.00563⁎⁎⁎ −0.00985⁎⁎⁎ −0.00479⁎⁎⁎
(.00685) (0.000519) (0.000567) (0.000421)
−0.00669⁎⁎⁎ −0.00929⁎⁎⁎ −0.00479⁎⁎⁎
(0.000933) (0.000938) (0.000682)
0 .00727 .0150 .0152
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
.381 .160 .364 .353
952 1428 1428 1428
missions per 1000 of the population in the cohort where the primary diagnosis refers to a
ned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWSpolicy, 1st July 2001. The dependent
admitted for drugs or alcohol diagnoses pre-policy, divided by the total number of men
e-policy period. All observations are at the borough-quarter-year level, and are weighted
mmy variable is equal to one from Q3 2001 to Q2 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-
lumns 1 to 3 then runs in the period after the LCWS is introduced, from Q3 2001 to Q4
s that have at least one such admissions in the pre-policy period. The sample in Columns
, excluding Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon, Merton, Southwark and Wandsworth). Panel
peciﬁc AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough speciﬁc
ted by the share of the total (excluding neighboring boroughs) London population that
01. Columns 2 and 5 relate to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001. Columns
orough and quarter ﬁxed effects, and control for shares of the population aged under 5
ant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of
from the HES administrative records at the borough-quarter-year level.
26 This downward trend among the speciﬁcations based on those with admission histo-
ries partially reﬂects the fact that not all such individuals are admittedmore than once. Of
the 12,271 individuals admitted for drugs or alcohol related diagnoses in the pre-policy
period, only 56% (6871 individuals) have a second admission at any point during the sam-
ple period, and only 38% (4684 individuals) have another episode in the policy or post-
policy period, and this naturally induces a downward time trend to be picked up in β0
and β2 in Eq. (2).
27 For the speciﬁcations in Columns 1–3 of Table A8 based on sampleswithout a prior re-
cord of hospital admissions the sample is only deﬁned from the time the LCWS is initiated
and is allowed to be linear thereafter (λb × quarters post Q3 2001). For the speciﬁcations
by age cohort with a history of admissions in Columns 4–6 of Table A8, the borough spe-
ciﬁc time trend is assumed to be linear over the sample period.
28 We have also tried to investigate one other source of heterogeneous responseswithin
age group: by diagnosis for Class-A admissions. More precisely, we split ICD-10 diagnosis
for Class-A drug admissions into two types (using primary and secondary diagnoses): (i)
those related to mental health and behavioral disorder (corresponding to ICD-10 codes
F11, F14, F16); and (ii) those related to acute conditions such as poisoning, and ﬁnding
the drug in the blood corresponding to ICD-10 codes (T400–T406 T408–T409, R781–
R785). The former better reﬂects longer term health problems, and the latter better re-
ﬂects acute issues related to use. On the relative frequency of these two types of diagnosis,
we note that diagnoses related to mental health/behavioral disorders are far more preva-
lent for the 25–34 and 34–44 age groups: these account for 75% of all Class-A related ad-
missions in Lambeth, while for the 15–24 age group there is a more even split across the
diagnosis types. However, when we split along these lines, the results are inconclusive:
there is a signiﬁcant increase in mental health disorders among those aged 15–24 on
the eve of the policy, and the point estimate is also positive for the 25–34 age cohort, al-
though not statistically signiﬁcant (results available upon request).
104 E. Kelly, I. Rasul / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 89–114per 1000 of the borough population, where by construction this admis-
sion rate is zero before the policy. For this group, we can effectively
estimate whether the depenalization policy differentially impacted
hospital admission rates between Lambeth and other non-neighboring
boroughs only in the time period after the policy is ﬁrst initiated
(namely from 2001 Q3 until 2009 Q4). Over this period we then
estimate the following balanced panel data speciﬁcation,
Admitdbqy ¼ α þ β2PPqy þ β3 Lb  PPqy
h i
þ δXbqy þ λb þ λq þ ubqy: ð4Þ
Hence the post-policy impacts aremeasured relative to the period in
which the LCWS policy is actually in place.
For those with pre-policy histories of admission, we denote the ad-
mission rate for diagnosis d, borough of residence b in quarter q of
year y as Admitdbqyhistory. We then estimate a speciﬁcation analogous to
Eq. (2) over the entire sample period but the numerator for the depen-
dent variable (Admitdbqyhistory) is not the borough population, but rather the
number of distinct individuals admitted for diagnoses related to illicit
drugs or alcohol while residing in borough b between April 1997 and
June 2001, that we denote (Admittedb,pre). These borough-quarter-year
aggregates are constructed from 1888 individuals in the 15–24age
cohort (of which 89 reside in Lambeth), 4544 in the 25–34age cohort
(of which 385 reside in Lambeth), and 6482 in the oldest age cohort
(of which 599 reside in Lambeth). Hence,
Admithistorydbqy ¼
Tothistorydbqy
Admittedb;pre
; ð5Þ
where Totdbqyhistory are total number of hospital admissions for diagnosis d,
among those residing in borough b, in quarter q of year y that have a his-
tory of admissions pre-policy. Note that this dependent variable changes
over time only because of changes in the numerator: the denominator
holds ﬁxed the ‘at risk’ population of all those with a history of hospital
admission for drug and alcohol-related diagnoses pre-policy. Given this
difference in how the dependent variable is deﬁned, the magnitude of
the policy impacts for those with admission histories are not directly
comparable to those without admission histories nor to the baseline re-
sults previously reported (that both use admission numbers per 1000 of
the borough population).
The results are presented in Table 5. Columns 1 to 3 consider admis-
sions among male each age cohort for those without a prior record of
admissions. The evidence suggests that for the oldest male age cohort,
there is a signiﬁcant increase in Class-A drug related hospitalizations
in Lambeth relative to the rest of London in the post-policy period rela-
tive to the policy period. The London-wide trends in admission rates
post-policy shown in Columns 1 to 3 β^2Þ

reﬂect how these samples
are deﬁned: admission rates for those without previous admissions
must necessarily rise (weakly) over time as the cohort ages, given
admission rates start at zero by construction and cannot be negative.
The data suggests that this upward cohort trend is signiﬁcantlymore pro-
nounced in Lambeth post-policy for the oldest age cohort. Themagnitude
of the impact for this cohort is large: an increase inhospitalization rates by
.160 corresponds to 44% of the pre-policy hospitalization rate for this co-
hort as a whole. To be clear, among this cohort we pick up the combined
impacts among those that were previously using illicit drugs (and poten-
tially other substances) but not so heavily so as to induce hospitalizations,
as well as those that begin to use cannabis and Class-A drugs for the ﬁrst
time as a result of the price impacts on cannabis of the depenalization pol-
icy. The administrative data utilized does not allow us to separate out the
policy impacts stemming from each type of individual.
Columns 4–6 in Table 5 consider policy impacts within each age co-
hort among those that have a prior history of at least one hospitalization
for drug or alcohol-related diagnoses. The results suggest that in thelonger term such cohorts are either not affected by the depenalization
policy, or for the oldest age cohort, their admission rates signiﬁcantly
decline in Lambeth in the long term.26 Such long term users, at least
among the two younger cohorts, might be more habituated in their
behavior and less price sensitive to any change in the price of cannabis
induced by the depenalization policy. If so, this result would be consis-
tentwith the evidence based onNLSY97 data in Deza (2011)whouses a
dynamic discrete choice model to document that the gateway effect
from cannabis to hard drug use is weaker among older age cohorts.
An obvious concern with these results is that they might in part be
confounded by natural time trends in hospitalizations for Class-A
drugs. These time trends might also differ across age groups and by hos-
pital admission histories. To address this, we repeat the analysis but aug-
ment Eqs. (4) and (2) with controls for borough speciﬁc linear time
trends. Table A8 presents the results, again broken down for cohorts
based on age and prior admission histories.27 The inclusion of borough
speciﬁc linear time trends serves to reinforce the earlier conclusions
among those without a prior history of admissions (Columns 1–3,
Table A8). Among those with a history of admissions, we continue to
ﬁnd no impact among the two youngest age cohorts, although among
the oldest cohort the policy now has a positive and signiﬁcant impact
on hospitalization rates.28
5.3. Alcohol
There is an established body of empirical work examining the
relationship between cannabis and alcohol use: this has generated
mixed results with some research ﬁnding evidence of the two being
complements (Pacula, 1998; Farrelly et al., 1999; Williams et al., 2004),
and other studies suggesting that the two are substitutes (DiNardo and
Lemieux, 2001; Crost and Guerrero, 2012; Anderson et al., 2013), or that
there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the two (Crost
andRees, 2013; Yörük andYörük, 2013).Manyof these studies have iden-
tiﬁed these impacts among young people, sometimes exploiting mini-
mum legal drinking age that should create discontinuities in alcohol
consumption for those aged around 21.
We provide a novel contribution to this debate by examining the
effect of depenalization on extreme forms of alcohol usage, leading to
hospitalizations.Wedo so for all threemale age cohorts. As documented
in the raw counts data in Table 2, such admissions occur with far higher
frequency for men in all age cohorts, than admissions for either Class-A
Table 6
The impact of the LCWS on hospital admissions for alcohol.
Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for alcohol-related diagnoses.
Admission rates for Primary diagnosis: alcohol-related Primary diagnosis: alcohol-related
(Class-A not recorded as secondary) Secondary diagnosis: Class-A drug related
Male age cohort Aged 15–24 Aged 25–34 Aged 35–44 Aged 15–24 Aged 25–34 Aged 35–44
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-policy × Lambeth −.0455⁎⁎ −.00875 .108 .0490 .0416 .255
(.0220) (.0459) (.0702) (.0879) (.311) (.522)
Policy period × Lambeth −.00316 −.0420 −.255⁎⁎ .232 −.00288 .00861
(.0365) (.0750) (.124) (.156) (.522) (.863)
Post-policy .0119 .0407⁎⁎⁎ .0941⁎⁎⁎ .0373 .0848⁎ .136⁎⁎⁎
(.00895) (.0153) (.0224) (.0243) (.0443) (.0508)
Policy period −.0123 −.000998 .0396 .0135 .0697 .0421
(.0115) (.0183) (.0252) (.0284) (.0507) (.0538)
Mean of dependent variable, Lambeth pre-policy .0679 .152 .590 .00316 .00867 .0331
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .398 .591 .664 .099 .122 .130
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 1428 1428 1428 1428 1428 1428
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of alcohol-related hospital admissions per 1000 of the population in the cohort. In Columns 1–3, the primary diagnosis refers to alcohol, and
Class-A drug diagnoses do not appear in the secondary diagnoses. In Columns 4–6, primary diagnoses refer to alcohol and secondary diagnoses that refer to Class-A drug use are included.
Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All observations are at the
borough-quarter-year level, and areweighted by thepopulation of the borough relative to thepopulation of London. The sample period runs fromQ21997 until Q4 2009. The policy period
dummy variable is equal to one from Q3 2001 to Q2 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy dummy is equal to one from Q3 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. Column 1 relates to
admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs, excluding Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon, Merton, Southwark and Wandsworth).
Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten regression,where a borough speciﬁc AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough speciﬁc
heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations areweighted by the share of the total (excluding neighboring boroughs) London population that year in
the borough. Columns 1 and 4 relate to admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Columns 2 and 5 relate to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001. Columns 3 and 6 relate
to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001. All speciﬁcations include borough and quarter ﬁxed effects, and control for shares of the population aged under 5 and over 75 at the
borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year level admissions formalignant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system,
and diseases of the digestive system. These admission rates are derived from the HES administrative records at the borough-quarter-year level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
105E. Kelly, I. Rasul / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 89–114drugs or cannabis. Hence any positive or negative impacts on admis-
sions for alcohol can have dramatic implications for the monetary
health costs of the policy. Throughout, we measure admission rates for
alcohol-related diagnoses analogously to those used as our dependent
variable in the baseline speciﬁcations, Eq. (1).
To begin with, we focus on admissions for alcohol-related diagnoses
where the primary diagnosis refers to alcohol. We exclude any admis-
sion that additionally refers to the use of Class-A substances as the sec-
ondary cause of admission. The results in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 6 show
that there was a signiﬁcant reduction in alcohol-related admissions
among the youngest cohort in Lambeth relative to the rest of London,
but there were no impacts on such alcohol-related admissions for
older cohorts. The result suggests that for the youngest age cohort, if
depenalization causes the price of cannabis to fall, then alcohol and
cannabis might well be substitutes.
The next set of speciﬁcations probe further to examine the evidence of
whether and how the policy impacts the combined use of alcohol and
Class-Adrugs: herewedeﬁne admission rateswhere the primary diagnosis
is again for alcohol-related diagnosis, but the secondary diagnosis refers to
the use of Class-A drugs. We ﬁnd no evidence that the policy causes such
combined admissions to change in the longer term (and this occurs against
a backdrop of London-wide increases in such combined diagnosis admis-
sions). Again, if the depenalization of cannabis caused increased cannabis
and Class-A drug use in the longer term, this last set of results supports
the assertion that such substances are not being used together, at least
among those most prone to extreme abuse of such substances.29 These results remain robust to having the dependent variable speciﬁed in logs so that
outliers are less likely to drive the estimated impacts.5.4. Severity of hospital admissions
A ﬁnal dimension along which to consider policy impacts relates to
the severity of hospitalizations, as measured by the number of days theindividual stays in hospital for, conditional upon admittance. This margin
is of policy relevance because it maps directly into the resultant
healthcare costs associated with the depenalization of cannabis, as calcu-
lated in the next section. We therefore ﬁrst document how the length of
individual hospital episodes for diagnoses related to Class-A drug use
changes differentially between Lambeth and other London boroughs
post-policy relative to the pre-policy period. To do so,we estimate a spec-
iﬁcation analogous to Eq. (2) but where the dependent variable is the in-
dividual length of hospital stay in days and the sample is conﬁned to
episodes where the primary diagnosis relates to Class-A drugs. We focus
on the ﬁrst episode for any hospital stay (that is the same as the entire hos-
pital stay for 93% of observations), and to avoid the results being driven by
outliers, we drop observations where the length of the stay is recorded to
be longer than 100 days (that excludes a further 2% of all stays).29 As
the outcome variable now relates to individual outcomes (rather than
borough-quarter-year aggregates), we cluster standard errors by borough
to capture unobservables determining the length of hospital stays that are
assumed correlated across residents of the same borough.
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 7 present the results, again split by age co-
hort. The data suggests that in the longer term post-policy, across all
three age cohorts, the length of stay for Class-A drug related admissions
signiﬁcantly increases in Lambeth relative to the London average. For
example, among the 15–24 age cohort, hospital stays increased by
3.7 days, and this is relative to a baseline pre-policy hospital stay length
of 7.2 days, an increase of 49%. The proportionate changes for the other
age cohorts are 29% for the 25–34 age cohort and 20% for the oldest
age cohort. Hence, the proportionate changes in length of hospital
30 Since 2003/4, hospitals have been paid a price or ‘tariff’ for each patient, based on the
diagnosis group. These are based on the average stay for the diagnosis group. Additional
days spent in hospital are paid at a daily rate. Prior to 2003/4, including the period covered
by the LCWS, funding was not as strongly linked to patient numbers or diagnoses.
31 The NHS does not break down daily hospital bed costs into anything analogous to
ﬁxed and marginal costs, or variations by diagnosis. This is partly because prior to 2003/
4, NHS hospitals were funded through block grants, with volume guarantees. Hospitals
were not therefore required to collect or publish costs about speciﬁc procedures or treat-
ment. Since 2003/04 a subset of NHS hospital activity has been subject to Payment by Re-
sults (PbR), so that hospitals are paid on the basis of their activity. PbR initially covered a
few select elective procedures, but expanded to cover 60% of an average hospitals activity
by the end of 2012. PbR was not introduced to Mental Health care until 2013/14.
Table 7
Impacts on length of hospital stay for Class-A drug related diagnoses.
Dependent variable: length of hospital stay in days for males admitted with.
Male age cohort (1) Aged 15–24 (2) Aged 25–34 (3) Aged 35–44
Post-policy × Lambeth 3.72⁎⁎⁎ 3.49⁎⁎⁎ 2.38⁎⁎⁎
(1.34) (.820) (.570)
Policy period × Lambeth .077 4.80⁎⁎⁎ −6.24⁎⁎⁎
(1.28) (1.09) (1.53)
Post-policy −2.74⁎ −2.43⁎⁎⁎ −1.97⁎⁎⁎
(1.34) (.798) (.615)
Policy period −.030 −.297 1.98
(1.39) (1.10) (1.54)
Mean of dependent variable, Lambeth pre-policy 7.46 15.14 10.58
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .083 .098 .071
Observation (individual hospital episode) 1374 2810 1806
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of days spent in hospital (discharge date–admission date) among those admitted to hospital for Class A drugs. Observations are at the episode
or admission level. The sample includes only theﬁrst episode of a hospital stay (93% of all episodes) and episodes lasting less than 100 days (excluding 160 or 2% of episodes across all years
and cohorts). Standard errors are clustered at the borough level. The sample period runs from January 1997 to December 2009. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from Q3
2001 toQ22002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy dummy is equal to one fromQ32002 onwards, and zero otherwise. All columns include borough andquarterﬁxedeffects, and control
for borough-quarter-year level admissions for malignant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system, and diseases of the
digestive system. All these admission rates are also derived from the HES administrative records at the borough-quarter-year level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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depenalization policy was introduced. This emphasizes that quite
apart from the impacts of the depenalization of cannabis on hospital-
ization rates for Class-A diagnosis that has been the focus of our anal-
ysis so far, the policy also has impacts on the severity of those
admissions for Class-A drug use. Both margins are relevant for think-
ing through the public health costs of the policy as detailed in the
next subsection.
We note further that the coefﬁcients in the third rowof Table 7 show
that in other London boroughs there are negative time trends in the
duration of such individual hospitalizations conditional on all other
controls in Eq. (2). Hence the ﬁndings for Lambeth post-policy do not
appear to be driven by some systematic lengthening of hospital stays
for such diagnosis that might be occurring more generally across
London.
6. The public health costs of the depenalization policy
Our ﬁnal set of results attempt to provide a lower bound estimate of
the public health costs to Lambeth associated with the depenalization
policy, as measured exclusively through hospitalizations related to
Class-A drug usage. This combines the earlier unconditional estimates
from Table 3 (that do not differ much from the baseline estimates in
Table 4) on changes in the number of individuals being hospitalized for
such diagnosis, and the results from Table 7 show the policy impacts on
the length of hospital episodes, holding constant hospitalization rates re-
lated to Class-A diagnoses. Combining the evidence on both margins al-
lows us to infer an overall lower bound increase in hospital bed-days
related to Class-A drug use attributable to the depenalization policy.
Speciﬁcally, the change in average hospital bed-days from the pre- to
the post-policy periods, per quarter for residents of borough b in cohort
c is given by,
ΔHbc ¼ Npost;bcLpost;bc−Npre;bcLpre;bc ð6Þ
where Npost,bc represents the number of admissions per quarter in the
post period in borough b for cohort c, and Lpost;bc is the average length
of stay of those that are admitted in this group in the post-policy period;
Npre,bc and Lpre;bc are of course analogously deﬁned over the pre-policyperiod. Rearranging Eq. (6), the change in hospital bed-days can be
decomposed as occurring through two channels,
ΔHbc ¼ Npost;bc−Npre;bc
 
Lpre;bc þ Npost;bcðLpost;bc−Lpre;bcÞ: ð7Þ
The ﬁrst channel represents the policy impact occurring through a
change in the number of hospital admissions for Class-A diagnoses,
holding constant the length of stay ﬁxed at the pre-reform levels. The
(Npost,bc− Npre,bc) term can be straightforwardly derived from the un-
conditional baseline estimates presented in Table 2. The second channel
represents the policy impact through a change in the average length of
hospital stays, holding constant admission numbers at the post-policy
level. The ðLpost;bc−Lpre;bcÞ corresponds exactly to the estimates reported
for each cohort in Table 7. The total public health cost of the policy is
then ΔHbc multiplied by the cost of a hospital bed-day.
Weuse published theNationalHealth Service estimates of the cost per
hospital bed-day.30 This cost is comprised largely of hospital ward costs
(nursing, therapies, basic diagnostics and overheads), hence there is actu-
ally little variation by diagnosis: the average cost per additional bed-day
across all adult inpatient diagnoses categories is £240 (Department of
Health, 2012), but the upper end of the hospital bed-day costs, relating
to those for adult acute (inpatient) mental health stays, are only slightly
higher at £295 (PSSRU, 2011). We therefore use a ﬁgure between these
estimates, of £250 per hospital bed-day, as quoted by the NHS Institute
(2012). This likely represents a lower bound of the true cost of a hospital
bed-day because it does not include any speciﬁc treatment costs or the
additional costs from any associated stay in intensive care.31
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hort to calculate each component of Eq. (7). For the youngest age co-
hort of those 15–24 on the eve of the depenalization policy, ΔHbc =
27.2 bed-days per quarter; of this total change, 24.1 bed-days oper-
ate through the ﬁrst channel of increased hospitalization rates, and
4.1 bed-days through the second channel of longer hospital stays
conditional on admission. Among those aged 25–34 on the eve of
the policy, ΔHbc = 52.5 bed-days per quarter, where the ﬁrst chan-
nel corresponds to an increase of 42.6 bed-days, and the second com-
ponent generates an increase of 9.9 bed-days. Finally, for the oldest
cohort of 35–44 year olds, ΔHbc = −26.9 bed-days per quarter,
where the point estimate in the third row of Table 2 implies a de-
crease in hospitalization rates post-policy of 30.7 bed-days (al-
though this point estimate was not statistically different from
zero), and this is only partially offset by the increase through the sec-
ond channel of 3.8 bed-days.
Applying the estimated costs per hospital bed-day of £250 to the
change in the total number of hospital bed-days per quarter, for
each cohort in Lambeth in the post-policy period on average, reveals
the increased public health cost to be: (i) £6802 among those aged
15–24 on the eve of the policy; and (ii) £13,136 among those aged
25–34 on the eve of the policy. Summing across four quarters we de-
rive the conservative public health cost of the depenalization policy
to be £79,752 per annum, on average across all the post-policy years
in the sample.
There are a number of ways this monetary amount can be
benchmarked. One way to do this would be relative to health costs
in Lambeth as a whole. However, there are multiple components of
health costs related to preventative and curative care, and it is un-
clear which subset of these costs provides the most appropriate
benchmark. Moreover, in England health expenditures stem from
both local borough sources but also expenditures of the national gov-
ernment. Given these complications, perhaps the more transparent
method through which the benchmark of the public health costs of
the depenalization policy is to compare it to the London-wide time
trends in hospital bed-days, by cohort. This provides a sense of the
increased public costs through natural rises over time in hospital
bed-days for hospitalizations related to Class-A drug use that
would have to be borne between the pre- and post-policy periods ab-
sent the depenalization policy. More precisely this London-wide
time trend for cohort c is given by,
ΔHc ¼ Npost;c−Npre;c
 
Lpre;c þ Npost;cðLpost;c−Lpre;cÞ; ð8Þ
where (Npost,c − Npre,c) can be derived from the coefﬁcient on the
post-policy dummy presented in the unconditional estimates in
Table 2, and ðLpost;c−Lpre;cÞ is measured from the coefﬁcient on the
post-policy dummy in Table 7. For the youngest age cohort of those
15–24 on the eve of the depenalization policy, ΔHc = 3.79 bed-days
per quarter; of this total change,−4.7 bed-days operate through the
ﬁrst channel of increased hospitalization rates, and 8.5 bed-days through
the second channel of longer hospital stays conditional on admission.
Among those aged 25–34 on the eve of the policy, ΔHc = −3.5 bed-
days per quarter, where the ﬁrst channel corresponds to a decrease of
6.5 bed-days, and the second component generates an increase of 3.0
bed-days. Finally, for the oldest cohort of 35–44 year olds, ΔHc =−2.4
bed-days per quarter, where the ﬁrst channel corresponds to an increase
of 2.6 bed-days, and the second component generates a decrease of 5.2
bed-days.
Aggregating these cohorts across four quarters then suggests the
natural decrease in costs associated with hospital bed-days is £4935.
Hence the increase in bed-days attributable to the policymore than off-
sets this natural decrease in hospital bed-days attributable to London-
wide time trends.Of course, this calculation still underestimates the total public costs
of the increased hospital bed-days within Lambeth due to the policy
because of the existence of many additional channels that we have
ignored. First, we have ignored any additional demands placed on other
parts of the national health service unrelated to hospital inpatient stays,
as a result of the depenalization policy. These include demands through
outpatient appointments, hospital emergency departments, and through
treatment centers. Indeed, the existing evidence from the US on the link
between the availability of cannabis and health relate to emergency or
treatment costs: Model (1993) ﬁnd that the de facto decriminalization
of cannabis in twelve US states from the mid-1970s signiﬁcantly
increased cannabis-related emergency room admissions. Chu (2012)
similarly ﬁnds that the passage of US state laws that allow individuals
to use cannabis for medical purposes leads to a signiﬁcant increase in re-
ferred treatments to rehabilitation centers. Second, we have ignored any
cost to individual users of being hospitalized. Such events almost surely
impact individual welfare, especially given the robust association found
across countries in the gradient between health and life satisfaction.
7. Discussion
We evaluate the impact of a policing experiment that depenalized
the possession of small quantities of cannabis in the London borough
of Lambeth, on hospital admissions related to illicit drug use. Despite
health costs being a major social cost associated with markets for illicit
drugs, evidence on the link between how such markets are regulated
and public health remains scarce. Our analysis provides novel evidence
on this relationship, at a time when many countries are debating mov-
ing towardsmore liberal policies towards illicit drugsmarkets.We have
exploited administrative records on individual hospital admissions clas-
siﬁed by ICD-10 diagnosis codes. We use these records to construct a
quarterly panel data set by London borough running from 1997 to
2009 to estimate the short and long run impacts of the depenalization
policy unilaterally introduced in Lambeth between 2001 and 2002.
We ﬁnd that the depenalization of cannabis had signiﬁcant
longer term impacts on hospital admissions related to the use of hard
drugs. Among Lambeth residents, the impacts are concentrated among
men in younger age cohorts. The dynamic impacts across cohorts
vary in proﬁle with some cohorts experiencing hospitalization rates re-
maining above pre-intervention levels three to four years after the
depenalizationpolicy isﬁrst introduced.Wecombine these estimated im-
pacts on hospitalization rates with estimates on how the policy impacted
the severity of hospital admissions to provide a lower bound estimate of
the public health cost of the depenalization policy.
Our analysis contributes to the nascent literature evaluating the
health impacts of changes in enforcement policies in themarket for illicit
drugs. The depenalization of cannabis is one of the most common
forms of such policy either implemented (such as in the Netherlands,
Australia and Portugal) or being debated around the world (such as in
many countries in Latin America). The practical way in which the local-
ized depenalization policy we study was implemented is very much in
line with policy changes in other countries that have changed enforce-
ment strategies in illicit drug markets and as such we expect our results
to have external validity to those settings. However unlike those settings,
we are able to exploit a (within-city) borough level intervention and so
estimate the policy impacts using a difference-in-difference design, as
well as exploring differential impacts across population cohorts, where
cohorts are deﬁned by gender, age, previous admissions history, and bor-
ough of residence. This is different frommuch of the earlier research that,
with the exception of studies based onUS or Australian data, can typically
only study nationwide changes in drug enforcement policies such as
depenalization, and have therefore had to rely on time variation alone
to identify policy impacts (Reuter, 2010). The administrative records we
exploit allow us to provide novel evidence on how the impacts of such
policies vary across population cohorts, over time within a cohort, and
how they interact with potential changes of residence of drug users.
32 Zeroes are mostly an issue for the youngest cohort — those aged 15–24. In Lambeth
there are noquarter-year observations in the pre- or post-policy period inwhich zero hos-
pitalizations are recorded for Class-A drugs. For the youngest cohort aged 15–24, around
70% of observations are zero pre-policy, and 3% are zero post-policy. In the rest of
London in the pre-period, around one-third (two-thirds) of borough-quarter-year obser-
vations are zero for the 25/24 and 35/44 (15–24) age cohorts. In thepost-policy period this
falls to zero for the two older age cohorts (as for Lambeth) and falls to aroundone third for
the youngest cohort. The proportion of zeroes is lower in Lambeth than the London-wide
average because Lambeth is a high-incidence borough.
33 Following Buis (2010), given that both interacted variables are binary, the average inter-
action effect on eachmargin can be calculated by: ﬁrst, using the Tobit estimates to produce
the conditional expected value of admissions for the four Lambeth × policy period (PPqy or
Pqy) cells (e.g, Lambeth = 0, PPqy = 0; Lambeth = 1, PPqy = 0; Lambeth = 0, PPqy = 1;
Lambeth = 0, PPqy = 0); and, second, taking the double difference of those conditional ex-
pected admission rates. The average interaction effect for the intensive margin in the post-
policy period is therefore equal to the following:
cβ3 ¼

E^ ARqyb
PPqy ¼ 1; Lb ¼ 1;λb ;λq;λy;Xbqy;ARqyb N0
h i
−E^ ARqyb PPqy ¼ 0; Lb ¼ 1;λb ;λq ;λy;Xbqy;Admitsqyb N0
 ih 
−

E^ ARqyb
PPqy ¼ 1; Lb ¼ 0;λb ;λq ;λy;Xbqy;Admitsqyb N0
h i
−E^ ARqyb PPqy ¼ 0; Lb ¼ 0;λb;λq ;λy;Xbqy;Admitsqyb N0
 ih  ð9Þ
where the conditional expected values are taken over all observations and then averaged.
The corresponding difference-in-difference coefﬁcient on the extensive margin (the proba-
bility of a non-zero admission rate) can be calculated analogously. The exercise is repeated
for the policy period.
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randomized control trial research designs. We have used a difference-
in-difference research design exploiting an unusual policy experiment
in one London borough that allows us to exploit within and across bor-
ough differences in health outcomes to identify policy impacts. The key
concern with such a research design is to distinguish policy impacts
from time trends. To do so, we have used the detailed administrative
records to present evidence on how different cohorts (by gender, age
and previous admission history) are differentially impacted by the pol-
icy, how the results are strengthened when controlling for time trends,
and checked for the presence of trends in the pre-policy period.
Our results suggest policing strategies have signiﬁcant, nuanced and
lasting impacts on public health. In particular our results provide a note
of caution to moves to adopt more liberal approaches to the regulation
of illicit drug markets, as typically embodied in policies such as
the depenalization of cannabis. While such policies may well have
numerous beneﬁts such as preventing many young people from being
criminalized (around 70% of drug-related criminal offenses relate to
cannabis possession in London over the study period), allowing the
police to reallocate their effort towards other crime types and indeed
reduce total crime overall (Adda et al., 2013), there remain potentially
offsetting costs related to public health that also need to be factored
into any cost–beneﬁt analysis of such approaches.
Two further broad points are worth reiterating. First, our analysis
relates to themore general study of the interplay between the consump-
tion of different types of drug. In particular there is a large literature test-
ing for the “gateway hypothesis” that the consumption of one “soft” drug
causally increases the probability of subsequently using a “harder drug”.
The crucial challenge for identiﬁcation is the potential for unobserved
factors or heterogeneity that could drive consumption of multiple types
of drug. Existing work has tried to tackle this problem by either:
(i) instrumenting the gateway drug with a factor unrelated to the under-
lying heterogeneity, typically using cigarette and alcohol prices (Pacula,
1998; DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001; Beenstock and Rahav, 2002); or,
(ii) using econometric techniques to model the possible effects of unob-
served heterogeneity (Pudney, 2003; van Ours, 2003; Melberg et al.,
2010). To be clear, in our analysiswemake no attempt to test for gateway
effects directly, but our contribution to this literature is to demonstrate
that the markets for cannabis and hard drugs are concretely linked— be
it because of gateway effects or some other channel — so that changes
in policy that affect one market will have important repercussions for
the other (DeSimone and Farrelly, 2003; van Ours and Williams, 2007;
Bretteville-Jensen et al., 2008).
Finally, our analysis highlights the impact that policing strategies can
have on public healthmore broadly. It is possible that other policing strat-
egies, such as police visibility or zero-tolerance policies, could also have
ﬁrst order implications for public health. These effects could operate
through a multitude of channels including: (i) police behavior directly
impacting markets and activities that determine individual health, such
as the case studied in this paper; and (ii) police behavior affecting percep-
tions of crime and thus inﬂuencing psychic well-being. This possibility
opens up a rich area of further study at the nexus of the economics of
crime and health.
Appendix A
A.1. Standard errors
Throughout the analysis, when estimating policy impacts on hospital-
ization rates, we have assumed that the disturbance terms follow a
Prais–Winsten borough speciﬁc AR(1) error structure, as described in
Section 3.3. In Appendix Table A3 we show the sensitivity of our baseline
results to the alternative assumption that standard errors are clustered by
borough, without any imposing any further assumptions on the correla-
tion structurewithin the borough. The results are shown in Columns 4 to
6 of Table A3, where as a point of comparison we repeat our baselinespeciﬁcation in Columns 1 to 3. We see that the standard errors are far
smaller assuming clustering by borough: they are at least half the mag-
nitude on the coefﬁcient of interest, and as a result, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
impacts on all three male age cohorts. One concern with such clustered
standard errors is that raised by Cameron et al. (2008): cluster-robust
standard errorsmay be downwards biasedwhen the number of clusters
is small (and in our speciﬁcation the number of clusters corresponds to
28, the number of boroughs in the sample). They propose various as-
ymptotic reﬁnements using bootstrap techniques, ﬁnding that the wild
cluster bootstrap-t technique performs particularly well in their Monte
Carlo simulations. We have implemented this method on our baseline
speciﬁcations and show in brackets in Columns 4 to 6 the resulting
p-values. This does not alter the signiﬁcance of any of the coefﬁcients
shown in Table A3 β^0; β^1; β^2; β^3Þ

. In short, the AR(1) error structure
assumed for our main results produces by far the most conservatively
estimated standard errors.A.2. Tobit estimates
In our baseline speciﬁcation, the dependent variable is the hospital
admissions rate, deﬁned in Eq. (1). By deﬁnition this variable cannot
be negative. We now present a robustness check on our baseline results
using Tobit estimates that treat zeroes differently from strictly positive
values.32 The Tobit model allows us to estimate the impact of the policy
on both the extensive margin (i.e. the probability that there is at
least one admission in a given borough-quarter) and the intensive mar-
gins (the admission rate per borough-quarter, conditional on at least
one admission). However, the introduction of non-linearity means the
difference-in-difference coefﬁcient no longer equals themarginal effect
of the interaction term (Ai and Norton, 2003). Policy impacts are there-
fore produced by using our Tobit estimates to calculate the average
interaction term for PPqy× Lambeth and Pqy× Lambeth.33 Estimated pol-
icy effects on the extensive and intensive margins are presented in
Table A4 bymale age cohort. In linewith the results in Table 4, thepolicy
leads to a statistically signiﬁcant increase in admission rates on the in-
tensive margin, that is an increase in the admission rate conditional
on at least one admission per borough quarter, for the two youngest
age cohorts. On the extensive margin, namely the probability of a posi-
tive admission rate, the impact is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant
except for the oldest cohort.
Table A1
Class-A drug related hospital admission rates for female cohorts, by borough and time period.
Means, standard deviations in parentheses, standard errors in square brackets.
Lambeth Rest of London Post-policy minus pre-policy
(1) Pre-policy (2) Post-policy (3) Pre-policy (4) Post-policy (5) Unconditional (6) Fixed effects
Women aged 15–24 .060 .098 .016 .033 .021 .021
(.067) (.079) (.047) (.066) [.024] [.024]
Women aged 25–34 .159 .149 .037 .038 −.010 −.009
(.090) (.071) (.059) (.057) [.023] [.023]
Women aged 35–44 .116 .116 .023 .021 −.003 −.003
(.071) (.082) (.044) (.041) [.028] [.028]
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 17 30 459 810 – –
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of female Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of the female population in the cohort, where the primary diagnosis refers to a
Class-A drug. Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Female age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All obser-
vations are at the borough-quarter-year level, and areweighted by the population of the borough relative to the population of London. In Columns 1 and 3 the pre-policy period runs from
Q1 1997 to Q2 2001. The policy period runs fromQ3 2001 to Q2 2002. In Columns 2 and 4 the post-policy period runs fromQ32001 to Q4 2009. In Columns 3 and 4 the sample is based on
all London boroughs excluding Lambeth and boroughs neighboring Lambeth. In Columns 5 and 6, standard errors on differences are calculated assuming a Prais–Winsten borough speciﬁc
AR(1) error structure, that allows for borough speciﬁc heteroskedasticity and error terms to be contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. In Column 6 the differences are calculated
from a regression speciﬁcation that also controls for borough and quarter ﬁxed effects.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
Table A2
Cannabis related hospital admissions for male cohorts, by borough and time period.
Means, standard deviations in parentheses, standard errors in square brackets.
Lambeth Rest of London Post-policy minus Pre-policy
(1) Pre-policy (2) Post-policy (3) Pre-policy (4) Post-policy (5) Unconditional (6) Fixed effects
Men aged 15–24 .055 .108 .025 .083 0.001 0.001
(.075) (.072) (.055) (.094) [0.018] [0.018]
Men aged 25–34 .083 .088 .025 .047 −0.018 −0.017
(.087) (.057) (.044) (.060) [0.027] [0.027]
Men aged 35–44 .125 .100 .018 .039 −0.046 −0.044
(.136) (.078) (.044) (.064) [0.041] [0.040]
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 17 30 459 810 – –
Notes: The dependent variable is the number ofmale cannabis related hospital admissions per 1000 of themale population in the cohort, where either the primary or secondary diagnosis
refers to cannabis. Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All observations are at the borough-quarter-year level, and are
weighted by the population of the borough relative to the population of London. In Columns 1 and 3 the Pre-policy period runs from Q1 1997 to Q2 2001. The policy period runs from
Q3 2001 to Q2 2002. In Columns 2 and 4 the post-policy period runs from Q3 2001 to Q4 2009. In Columns 3 and 4 the sample is based on all London boroughs excluding Lambeth
and boroughs neighboring Lambeth. In Columns 5 and 6, standard errors on differences are calculated assuming a Prais–Winsten borough speciﬁc AR(1) error structure, that allows for
borough speciﬁc heteroskedasticity and error terms to be contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. In Column 6 the differences are calculated from a regression speciﬁcation
that also controls for borough and quarter ﬁxed effects.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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Table A3
Standard errors.
Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related diagnoses.
Standard errors Baseline: AR(1) Clustered by borough
Wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets
Male age cohort (1) Aged 15–24 (2) Aged 25–34 (3) Aged 35–44 (4) Aged 15–24 (5) Aged 25–34 (6) Aged 35–44
Post-policy × Lambeth .0380⁎ .0749⁎⁎ −.0339 .0374⁎⁎⁎ .0748⁎⁎⁎ −.0336⁎⁎⁎
(.0229) (.0334) (.0626) (.00934) (.0115) (.00745)
[.000] [.000] [.002]
Policy period × Lambeth .0282 −0.0288 −.156 .0275⁎⁎⁎ −0.0323 −.145⁎⁎⁎
(.0396) (.0606) (.104) (.00681) (.0144) (.0103)
[.995] [.995] [.002]
Post-policy .0289⁎⁎⁎ −.00715 .000513 .0328⁎⁎⁎ −.00487 −.00309
(.00609) (.00707) (.00766) (.00839) (.00934) (.0120)
[.000] [.547] [.167]
Policy period .00986 −.0227⁎⁎⁎ −.0123 .0121⁎ −.0189 −.0163
(.00765) (.00775) (.00892) (.00634) (.0128) (.0115)
[.058] [.146] [.737]
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear borough speciﬁc time trend No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .256 .395 .435 .219 .353 .471
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 1428 1428 1428 1428 1428 1428
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of the population in the cohort where the primary diagnosis refers to a Class-A drug.
Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All observations are at the
borough-quarter-year level, and areweighted by thepopulation of the borough relative to thepopulation of London. The sample period runs fromQ21997 until Q4 2009. The policy period
dummy variable is equal to one from Q3 2001 to Q2 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy dummy is equal to one from Q3 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. Column 1 relates to
admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs, excluding Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon, Merton, Southwark and Wandsworth). In
Columns 1 to 3, panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten regression, where a borough speciﬁc AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms
to be borough speciﬁc heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. In Columns 4 to 6, standard errors are clustered by borough. In Columns 4 to 6 we also report
the cluster wild bootstrap p-values following the procedure of Cameron et al. (2008). Observations are weighted by the share of the total (excluding neighboring boroughs) London pop-
ulation that year in the borough. Columns 1 and 4 relate to admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Columns 2 and 5 relate to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001.
Columns 3 and 6 relate to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001. All speciﬁcations include borough and quarter ﬁxed effects, and control for shares of the population aged under
5 and over 75 at the borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year level admissions formalignant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the
respiratory system, and diseases of the digestive system. These admission rates are derived from the HES administrative records at the borough-quarter-year level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
Table A4
Tobit speciﬁcations.
Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related diagnoses. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Margin Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
Male age cohort Aged 15–24 Aged 25–34 Aged 35–44
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-policy × Lambeth .150 .0434⁎⁎⁎ .0133 .0712⁎⁎⁎ .0385⁎ −.0441
(.109) (.0147) (.0252) (.0241) (.0220) (.0308)
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 1428 1428 1428 1428 1428 1428
Notes: The dependent variable the number of Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of the population in the cohortwhere the primary diagnosis refers to a Class-A drug. Class-
A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All observations are at the
borough-quarter-year level, and areweighted by thepopulation of the borough relative to thepopulation of London. The sample period runs fromQ21997 until Q4 2009. The policy period
dummy variable is equal to one from Q3 2001 to Q2 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy dummy is equal to one from Q3 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. Column 1 relates to
admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs, excluding Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon, Merton, Southwark and Wandsworth).
Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten regression,where a borough speciﬁc AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough speciﬁc
heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations areweighted by the share of the total (excluding neighboring boroughs) London population that year in
the borough. Columns 1 and 4 relate to admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Columns 2 and 5 relate to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001. Columns 3 and 6 relate
to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001. All speciﬁcations include borough and quarter ﬁxed effects, and control for shares of the population aged under 5 and over 75 at the
borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year level admissions formalignant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system,
and diseases of the digestive system. These admission rates are derived from the HES administrative records at the borough-quarter-year level. The estimates on the interaction terms,
Post-policy × Lambeth coefﬁcients are produced by taking the double difference of the conditional expected values for the four Lambeth (0 and 1) × Post-policy (0 and 1) cells.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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Table A5
Pre-policy common trends check. Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related diagnoses.
Male age cohort (1) Aged 15–24 (2) Aged 25–34 (3) Aged 35–44
2nd half Pre-policy × Lambeth .0216 −.00403 −.00509
(.0278) (.0356) (.0468)
2nd half pre-policy .0122⁎⁎ .0103 .00206
(.00494) (.00838) (.0123)
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .187 .393 .680
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 476 476 476
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of the population in the cohort where the primary diagnosis refers to a Class-A drug.
Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All observations are at the
borough-quarter-year level, and are weighted by the population of the borough relative to the population of London. The sample period runs from Q2 1997 until Q2 2001, the eve of the
LCWS policy. The “2nd half Pre-policy” dummy indicator is equal to one in the second half of this sample period, and zero otherwise. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs,
excluding Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon, Merton, Southwark andWandsworth). Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten regression, where a borough spe-
ciﬁc AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough speciﬁc heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are weighted by
the share of the total (excluding neighboring boroughs) London population that year in the borough. Column1 relates to admissions of those aged15–24 on 1st July 2001. Column2 relates
to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001. Column 3 relates to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001. All speciﬁcations include borough and quarter ﬁxed effects, and
control for shares of the population aged under 5 and over 75 at the borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year level admissions for malignant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear,
diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system, and diseases of the digestive system. These admission rates are derived from the HES administrative records at the
borough-quarter-year level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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Table A6
Varying the sample of comparison boroughs.
Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related diagnoses.
Comparison boroughs High drug admission rates, pre-policy Very drug admission rates,
pre-policy
Including neighboring boroughs Boroughs with teaching hospitals Boroughs with mental health
trusts
Male age cohort 15–24 25–34 35–44 15–24 25–34 35–44 15–24 25–34 35–44 15–24 25–34 35–44 15–24 25–34 35–44
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Post-policy × Lambeth .0279 .104⁎⁎⁎ −.0181 .0445 .134⁎⁎⁎ −.0371 0.0394⁎ 0.0775⁎⁎ −0.0361 .0573⁎⁎ .113⁎⁎⁎ −.0245 .0494⁎ .0909⁎⁎⁎ −.0611
(.0250) (.0301) (.0578) (.0279) (.0372) (.0589) (0.0232) (0.0325) (0.0622) (.0245) (.0319) (.0603) (.0260) (.0348) (.0621)
Policy period × Lambeth .0458 .0360 −.111 .0757 .0732 −.106 0.0315 −0.0174 −0.151 .0408 .0183 −.141 .0285 −.0263 −.153
(.0435) (.0530) (.0988) (.0462) (.0549) (.0987) (0.0403) (0.0593) (0.104) (.0421) (.0568) (.100) (.0413) (.0600) (.0999)
Post-policy .0352⁎⁎⁎ −.00874 .0242 .0268⁎ .00368 .0932⁎ 0.0250⁎⁎⁎ −0.00617 0.00370 .00174 −.00666 .0468⁎⁎ .0147 −.00297 .0238
(.0103) (.0163) (.0208) (.0151) (.0379) (.0477) (0.00574) (0.00762) (0.00776) (.00863) (.0149) (.0223) (.0108) (.0142) (.0174)
Policy period −.00380 −.0839⁎⁎⁎ −.0520⁎⁎ −.0263 −.129⁎⁎⁎ −.0400 0.00500 −0.0308⁎⁎⁎ −0.0168⁎ −.0150 −.0562⁎⁎⁎ −.0101 .00469 −.0234⁎ −.0124
(.0132) (.0207) (.0240) (.0184) (.0453) (.0511) (0.00735) (0.00882) (0.00934) (.00999) (.0160) (.0228) (.0125) (.0140) (.0162)
R-squared .321 .353 .485 .237 .593 .382 0.261 0.417 0.479 .242 .451 .533 .196 .414 .546
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 510 510 510 204 204 204 1632 1632 1632 408 408 408 306 306 306
Number of Boroughs (incl. Lambeth) 10 10 10 4 4 4 32 32 32 8 8 8 6 6 6
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of the population in the cohort where the primary diagnosis refers to a Class-A drug. Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. Male
age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWS policy, 1st July 2001. All observations are at the borough-quarter-year level, and are weighted by the population of the borough relative to the total population of the sample
boroughs. The sample period runs from Q2 1997 until Q4 2009. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from Q3 2001 to Q2 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy dummy is equal to one from Q3 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. In
Columns 1–3, control boroughs are all other boroughs with high drug admissions rates in the pre-policy period (deﬁned as having a Pre-policy admission rate of at least .08 across cohorts aged 15 and 44). These nine boroughs are Bexley, Bromley,
Camden, Croydon, Greenwich, Kensington and Chelsea, Lewisham, Southwark, Westminster. In Columns 4–6, control boroughs are all other boroughs with very high drug admissions rates in the pre-policy period, deﬁned as all those boroughs that
have a pre-policy admission rate of at least .16 across cohorts aged 15 and 44. These three boroughs are Greenwich, Lewisham and Southwark. In Columns 10–12 the control boroughs are thosewith a teaching hospital in them. In Columns 13–15 the
control boroughs are thosewith amental health trust headquartered in them. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten regression, where a borough speciﬁc AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be
borough speciﬁc heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are weighted by the share of the total (excluding neighboring boroughs) London population that year in the borough. Columns 1, 4, 7, 10 and 15
relate to admissions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Columns 2, 5, 8, 11 and 14 relate to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001. Columns 3, 6, 9, 12 and 15 relate to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001. All speciﬁcations
include borough and quarter ﬁxed effects, and control for shares of the population aged under 5 and over 75 at the borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year level admissions for malignant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of the
circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system, and diseases of the digestive system. These admission rates are derived from the HES administrative records at the borough-quarter-year level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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Table A7
Nationwide depenalization policy.
Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related diagnoses.
Sample 1997 Q2–2003 Q4
Male age cohort (1) Aged 15–24 (2) Aged 25–34 (3) Aged 35–44
Post-policy × Lambeth .0362 .0753⁎⁎ .134⁎
(.0281) (.0378) (.0799)
Policy period ×Lambeth .0222 −.0550 −.147
(.0320) (.0445) (.0924)
Post-policy .00152 −.0164⁎ −.00546
(.00556) (.00938) (.0139)
Policy period −.000276 −.0242⁎⁎⁎ −.0107
(.00531) (.00841) (.0125)
Mean of dependent variable, Lambeth Pre-policy .037 .179 .362
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .191 .416 .581
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 756 756 756
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of the population in the cohort where the primary diagnosis refers to a Class-A drug.
Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, and hallucinogens. All observations are at the borough-quarter-year level. In Columns 1–-3, the sample period runs fromQ21997 until Q4 2003, and
the control boroughs are all other London boroughs, excluding Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon,Merton, Southwark andWandsworth). In Columns 4–6, the sample runs fromQ21997 until
Q4 2009 and exclude both Lambeth and her neighbors. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten regression, where a borough speciﬁc AR(1) process is as-
sumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough speciﬁc heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are weighted by the share of the total
(excluding neighboring boroughs) London population that year in the borough. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from Q3 2001 to Q2 2002, and zero otherwise. The
post-policy dummy is equal to one from Q3 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The National-policy is a dummy equal to 1 after Q1 2004 and zero otherwise. Column 1 relates to admis-
sions of those aged 15–24 on 1st July 2001. Column 2 relates to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001. Column 3 relates to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001.
All speciﬁcations include borough and quarter ﬁxed effects, and control for shares of the population aged under 5 and over 75 at the borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year
level admissions for malignant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system, and diseases of the digestive system. These
admission rates are derived from the HES administrative records at the borough-quarter-year level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
Table A8
Time trends and the impact of the LCWS by male age cohort and admission history.
Dependent variable: male hospital admission rates for Class-A drug related diagnoses.
Aged 15–24 Aged 25–34 Aged 35–44 Aged 15–24 Aged 25–34 Aged 35–44
Pre-policy drugs or alcohol admissions No No No Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-policy × Lambeth .0442 .121 .260⁎⁎⁎ .000168 .00215 .00447⁎⁎
(.0342) (.0753) (.0779) (.00775) (.00279) (.00227)
Policy period policy × Lambeth .000387 .00101 .00455⁎⁎
(.00746) (.00285) (.00221)
Post-policy −.00411 .0122 .0159⁎⁎ .00942⁎⁎⁎ .0111⁎⁎⁎ .00329⁎⁎⁎
(.00688) (.00797) (.00749) (.00109) (.00106) (.000769)
Policy period .00863⁎⁎⁎ .01000⁎⁎⁎ .00411⁎⁎⁎
(.000972) (.000954) (.000699)
Borough and quarter ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borough speciﬁc linear time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .171 .332 .394 .188 .418 .431
Observations (borough-quarter-year) 952 952 952 1428 1428 1428
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1–3 is the number of Class-A drug related hospital admissions per 1000 of the population in the cohort where the primary diagnosis refers to a
Class-A drug. Class-A drugs include cocaine, opioids, andhallucinogens.Male age cohorts are deﬁned by age on the eve of the introduction of the LCWSpolicy, 1st July 2001. The dependent
variable in Columns 4–6 is the number of admissions for Class A drugs amongmenwhowere admitted for drugs or alcohol diagnoses pre-policy, divided by the total number of men ad-
mitted for drugs or alcohol-related diagnoses in a given borough and quarter during the pre-policy period. All observations are at the borough-quarter-year level, and are weighted by the
population of the borough relative to the population of London. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one fromQ3 2001 to Q2 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy dummy is
equal to one fromQ32002 onwards, and zero otherwise. Columns 1 to 3 restrict hospital admission rates to be constructed from those individuals that have no such admissions in the pre-
policy period. The sample in Columns 1 to 3 then runs in the period after the LCWS is introduced, from Q3 2001 to Q4 2009. Columns 4 to 5 restrict hospital admission rates to be con-
structed from those individuals that have at least one such admissions in the pre-policy period. The sample in Columns 4 to 6 then runs from Q2 1997 until Q4 2009. Control boroughs
are all other London boroughs, excluding Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon, Merton, Southwark andWandsworth). Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais–Winsten re-
gression, where a borough speciﬁc AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough speciﬁc heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs.
Observations are weighted by the share of the total (excluding neighboring boroughs) London population that year in the borough. Columns 1 and 4 relate to admissions of those aged
15–24 on 1st July 2001. Columns 2 and 5 relate to admissions of those aged 25–34 on 1st July 2001. Columns 3 and 6 relate to admissions of those aged 35–44 on 1st July 2001. All spec-
iﬁcations include borough and quarter ﬁxed effects, and control for shares of the population aged under 5 and over 75 at the borough-year level, and borough-quarter-year level admis-
sions formalignant neoplasm, diseases of the eye and ear, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the respiratory system, and diseases of the digestive system. These admission rates
are derived from the HES administrative records at the borough-quarter-year level. All speciﬁcations control for a linear borough speciﬁc time trend.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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